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Abstract 
 
The pharmaceutical industry offers valuable products that may positively affect the lives and 
well–being of people. The industry has been criticized for enormous profits, which some often 
link to unethical decisions. This paper will concern the international marketing of 
pharmaceutical products, and factors such as prices, patents, government and regulation, 
information asymmetry, as well as how cultural differences may lead to certain challenges.  
Corruption is a part of unethical acts, and it is an important phenomenon, as corrupt decisions 
may drastically affect the well-being and daily lives of millions of people around the world. 
Corruption will be defined, as well as corruption in the pharmaceutical sector, as the 
pharmaceutical sector is a vast, several hundred-billion dollar industry. Sadly, the 
counterfeit/substandard drug trade has risen to become a $75 billion dollar industry as well, 
and it will be discussed what corporations and governments can do to ensure fair, ethical 
conduct of business, and how to ensure that the end-consumers get the real product. The 
purpose of this paper is to look deeper into the factors involved in international marketing, the 
ethics involved, how corruption may occur in the pharmaceutical industry – how to combat it, 
and what an international marketer must be aware of when navigating the landscape of the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
 
Key words: Pharmaceutical sector, international marketing, ethics, inadequate institutions, 
patent laws, corruption.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
“It is clear that the pharmaceutical industry is not, by any stretch of the imagination, doing 
enough to ensure that the poor have access to adequate medical care.” 
- Paul Farmer, co-founder of Partners In Health and editor-in-chief of Health and 
Human Rights Journal 
“Advances in medicine and agriculture have saved vastly more lives than have been lost in all 
the wars in history.” 
- Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World (1996), p.11. 
  
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the ethical marketing of pharmaceuticals, and how 
corruption in the pharmaceutical sector may occur. Theories and articles concerning the 
ethical marketing of pharmaceuticals and corruption in the pharmaceutical industry will be 
analyzed, to get a better understanding of how pharmaceuticals are marketed. The 
phenomenon in question – ethics in the international marketing of pharmaceuticals is 
important, as drugs has helped numbers of people – beyond count – all around the world. 
The standard of living has risen drastically in modern times, along with general health. The 
average lifespan of a human being has increased from 60 years to 75+ (at least in the 
developed world), due to progress in the medical field. The pharmaceutical sector offers a 
valuable service, but it has always been criticized; both when it comes to marketing practices, 
the conduct and corruption – but nevertheless, pharmaceuticals are very important products 
that may be the determinant in life-or-death situations for millions upon millions of people 
around the world.   
This paper will concern how pharmaceuticals are marketed, from producer to distributor, 
doctors/physicians, and to the end consumer/patients, and the influence the pharmaceutical 
companies has on the medical profession and the industry. Government regulation, legislature 
and institution, how the pharmaceutical products are being patented and priced – as well as 
the conflict of interest that may occur within the medical profession, and the information 
asymmetry that exists between the industry and the consumers (patients) will also be 
discussed.  
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By exploring the definitions of marketing, pricing, ethics, patent protection and corruption, 
both in general - and in the pharmaceutical sector, it will be discussed how to get an even 
better understanding of  the pharmaceutical sector. The pharmaceutical industry is susceptible 
for corrupt practices, the paper will shed light on what an international marketer should be 
aware of,  to ensure the product is being marketed and distributed in a sound, ethical fashion. 
The pharmaceutical sector is often portrayed as unethical, greedy and excessively profitable, 
which will also be discussed, to get a better understanding of the critic’s, and the industry’s 
point of view. The theories will be discussed 
A significant portion of the paper will address corruption, as it is the ultimate form of 
unethical acts, and a framework for identifying corruption in the pharmaceutical industry will 
be presented. It is important to address the fact that corruption in the pharmaceutical sector 
has risen drastically in recent years, mostly due to substandard and counterfeit drugs flooding 
the market, as well as how pharmaceutical products are being marketed. The environment an 
international marketer has to navigate - when dealing with pharmaceuticals in the 
international marketing setting, will be assessed. As Transparency International puts it in a 
document on their website; “The pharmaceutical system is susceptible to corruption for a 
variety of reasons. One of the most significant is the degree of government involvement in its 
regulation: studies from other sectors have found that the incidence of corruption is 
noticeably higher when the state retains a major involvement in the economy and its 
bureaucracy is pervasive. Without robust institutional checks, government regulators can 
make discretionary asymmetries exist between patient and physician” (Cohen, 2006, in 
Transparency International).  
  
6 
 
Theories & Discussion: 
 
2.1 International marketing: 
 
 
(Lecture #1 in International Marketing, Falkenberg, A., 2012) 
Albaum & Duerr provides a simple definition of international marketing: “international 
marketing is the marketing of goods, services, and information across political boundaries. 
Thus it includes the same elements as domestic marketing: planning, promoting, distributing, 
pricing, and support of the goods, services, and information to be provided to intermediate 
and ultimate consumers.” (Albaum & Duerr, International marketing and export 
management, 2011, p.21) International marketing is typically more complex than domestic 
marketing because of the need to accommodate key differences between the environment in 
the “home” country’s domestic environment and the environment in the foreign market. The 
differences may include culture, consumer behavior, economic situation, market structures 
and the channels available, how business is conducted, and laws and regulations. These 
factors can render the company’s domestic approach ineffective (or even illegal) in the 
foreign market. The differences between the domestic and foreign market requires one to 
undertake a careful and well-planned approach when entering a foreign market or expanding 
internationally (Albaum & Duerr, 2011). 
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Marketing effectively in and to a foreign environment requires a clear understanding of each 
target market, the differences between them, and what accommodations must be done - 
fortunately there is information available on nearly every market in the world. The costs of 
acquiring this information, with regard to time and effort, can be expected to be far lower than 
the costs of making a mistake. There are facilitating organizations that can provide assistance 
in most aspects of marketing, though the effectiveness and costs may vary widely from 
country to country. Companies that provide assistance specifically for exporting and the legal 
and logistical aspects of importing are widely available – but in the end, it is the marketing 
manager’s responsibility to develop an effective approach to the target markets (Albaum & 
Duerr, 2011). “It is also of great importance that top management be aware of all 
requirements so that adequate support can be provided. The business activities that must be 
carried out in marketing include the following:  
 
- The analysis of markets and potential markets; 
 
- The planning and development of products and services that consumers want clearly 
identified in a suitable package; 
 
- The distribution of products through channels that provide the services or conveniences 
demanded by purchasers; 
 
- The promotion of products and services - including advertising and personnel selling - to 
inform and educate consumers about those products and services, or persuade consumers to 
try new, improved, or different ways of satisfying their wants and needs; 
 
- The setting of prices that reflect both a reasonable value (or utility) of products or services 
to the consumers, as well as a satisfactory profit or return on investment; 
 
- The technical and non-technical support given to consumers - both before and after a sale is 
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made - to ensure their satisfaction, and thus pave the way for possible future sales that are 
necessary for company survival, growth, and perpetuation; 
 
- The organizational structure, management, and remuneration of foreign employees.” 
(Albaum & Duerr, International marketing and export management, 2011, p.23-24) 
One might say internationalization has three key points: a process, an end result, and/or a way 
of thinking. As a firm becomes more involved to serving markets outside of its home country, 
it becomes internationalized – this may be a planned process, or it may be the result from new 
opportunities and/or threats (Albaum & Duerr, 2011). “For the international marketer, 
internationalization is most effective when developed as a carefully planned process for 
increasing penetration of international markets. In entering target markets, companies have 
traditionally begun with exporting, later developed a sales subsidiary abroad, and finally 
developed production facilities abroad. Licensing may be used as an initial entry strategy for 
some companies, and at later stages for others. Strategic alliances may be formed. Whatever 
the approaches used they should be carefully thought out, with advantages and disadvantages 
carefully analyzed, before implementation” (Albaum & Duerr, International marketing and 
export management, 2011, p.24) 
Albaum & Duerr also writes that the terms: international, multinational and global, are used 
frequently in international marketing. The three terms may seem to be rather similar, but it 
helpful to distinguish between them – as they represent differences in marketing strategy. 
International marketing may refer to the marketing that is done in foreign nations, and it can 
include exporting a single product to one country – to exporting a number of products to 
several countries. Multinational marketing used to be a term to describe companies who 
focused more on international marketing – and who treated the foreign markets as separate, 
creating strategies and products suited for each respective market. (Albaum & Duerr, 2011) 
Levitt (1986) suggested that global corporations would treat the entire world, or a region, as a 
single entity. These corporations would sell their products in the same way all across the 
globe – and thus the term global marketing came into use. Levitt noted that the preferences of 
people around the world would become more similar, and argued that people would accept 
these products – if the price and quality was right (Albaum & Duerr, 2011) “The economies of 
scale in producing and marketing a product in the same way worldwide would produce 
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substantially lower costs, and thus allow lower prices that would overcome remaining 
differences in tastes” (Albaum & Duerr, International marketing and export management, 
2011, p.25). Coca-Cola, Pepsi and McDonalds are great examples of global marketing. Coca-
Cola is available nearly everywhere in the world, and there are few people who has never seen 
a Cola bottle or never heard about the product. McDonalds as well, where you can go into a 
McDonald’s restaurant located anywhere in the world – and still get the same standardized 
product (with the exception of Israel – where it has to be kosher, and India – where cows are 
considered holy). Pharmaceuticals on the other hand, are standardized products, and if you 
buy/get prescribed a certain brand name, you have several expectations – like Viagra or 
Paracetamol. Pharmaceutical products are more or less the same world-wide, but the methods 
of marketing differ from market to market. Some have restrictions on 
advertising/commercials for pharmaceuticals (like Norway) – whilst other nations, like the 
U.S. advertise openly for prescription drugs, encouraging consumers to buy the products.  
The following part is an analysis of the previous theories, using the article When in Rome … 
Moral maturity and ethics for International Organizations (2004), by Andreas Falkenberg. 
Falkenberg writes: “During the past 30 years, we have seen the emergence of very different 
views of the firm. From micro-economics and in finance we have seen the emergence of 
transaction cost economics and principal agent theory, both of which assume that man is 
opportunistic, selfish and not necessarily honest. We therefore need to create control systems 
(sticks) and incentive systems (carrots) which promote and protect the welfare of the owners 
or of society as a whole from opportunistic managers. The emerging area of corporate 
governance addresses these problems at the intersection between strategy and finance. This 
view assumes that individuals are selfish egoists and must be carefully controlled. The 
desirability of the carrots may have been stronger than the fear of the sticks in the cases of 
Enron, Parmelat and perhaps for some of the Russian oligarchs” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.2). 
When it comes to the ethical egoist view of ethics, one may think of Multinational 
Corporations (MNC’s) as they have been seen as economic powerhouses who are pursuing 
their own interests - with little regard for the happiness of people and the environment. “This 
impression is consistent with a narrow view of the economic man’s self-interested behavior 
taught in many business schools” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.2). According to transaction cost 
economics, man is opportunistic i.e. “self-interested seeking with guile, to include calculated 
efforts to mislead, deceive, obfuscate and otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1994, p. 102 in 
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Falkenberg, 2004, p.2). The principal-agent model (PAM) also contains similar assumptions, 
where the agent is assumed to have no moral barriers against dishonest behavior, as well as 
effort aversion and deceitfulness (Bøhren, 1998: Jensen and Meckling, 1976 in Falkenberg, 
2004). Another statement is that “Business schools tend to recruit a disproportionately high 
number of self-interested students” (Frank et al., 1993 in Falkenberg, 2004, p.3). “The schools 
may reinforce this view and the students may conclude that if everyone thinks it is normal 
behavior to cheat and deceive, then people will cheat and deceive without feeling guilty” ( 
Noreeen, 1988 in Falkenberg, 2004, p.3). Managers learn that people they deal with inside or 
outside the firm should not be trusted, as they are expected to cheat if they can. This makes it 
indirectly OK to cheat – if you do not get caught – as the behavior is expected. Managers are 
also taught to work for their own benefit – and the owner’s, and these two benefits are often 
linked through incentive programs that are connected to the manager’s economic interests. 
Falkenberg also states: “If it is legal, go ahead and do it, use cost/benefit analysis as a 
(moral) guide. Pay as little as possible and charge as much as possible. In Kohlberg’s scheme 
this would be a relative primitive version of the “sticks and carrots” view of moral 
development. It would be hard to argue that this view represents a set of desirable ethical 
guidelines for a firm; be it in the less- or more developed economies”(Falkenberg, 2004, p.3). 
The modern version of the ethical egoist view is not quite the same as the ideas produced by 
the “fathers” of utilitarianism and economics - and how they looked upon markets and 
competition. John Stuart Mill described Utilitarianism as a way to produce as much good as 
possible, for all, at a macro level (Falkenberg, 2004). 
“… for that standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest happiness 
altogether … (happiness) secured to all mankind; and not for them only, but so far as the 
nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation” (John Stuart Mill, 1863 in Falkenberg, 
2004, p.3). 
John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith were rather skeptical to the pursuit of one’s own happiness 
without regarding the common good:  “Next to selfishness, the principle cause, which makes 
life unsatisfactory, is want of mental cultivation… As little is there an inherent necessity that 
any human being should be a selfish egoist, devoid of every feeling or care but those which 
center on his own miserable individuality” (John Stuart Mill, 1863 in Falkenberg, 2004, p.3). 
“The interest of the dealers … is always in some respects different from and even opposite to 
that of the public … The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes 
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from this order ought always be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be 
adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, 
but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men whose interest is never 
exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to 
oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasion both deceived and 
oppressed it” (Adam Smith, 1776 in Falkenberg, 2004, p.3). 
These comments may still be relevant today and their statements have been confirmed 
numerous times, from the era of the robber barons (e.g. Lewis, 1951 in Falkenberg 2004) to 
the failures of Parmelat and Enron case (e.g. Watkins and Schwartz, 2003 in Falkenberg, 
2004). If the morality of large firms were described by the selfish-egoist view, one should 
regard the MNC’s with suspicion (Falkenberg, 2004).  
Smith and Mill also pointed out the benefits of having “markets and competition, the 
unrestricted mobility of resources to their most productive use (Smith) and that a test of ethics 
must imply that good outcomes have been created for the whole creation (Mill)” (Falkenberg, 
2004, p.3). Smith and Mill were not fond of people or organizations that disregarded the 
interest of the public – but – human rights were not regarded highly be utilitarians. Jeremy 
Bentham commented on human’s natural rights as “nonsense upon stilts” (cited in Almond, 
1993 in Falkenberg, 2004, p.3). Ethical egoism and utilitarianism are both consequentialist 
perspectives that use cost/benefit calculations - however, classical utilitarianism is more about 
maximizing overall happiness over time and not the short term happiness of an individual or 
firm (Falkenberg, 2004)  
“From the behavioral disciplines in business schools like strategy, management and 
marketing literature, we have seen an increasing emphasis on the long term perspective 
regarding the relationships between individuals and firms, and the value of trust and 
commitment in such relationships” (e.g. Arndt, 1979 in Falkenberg, 2004, p.4). This is 
represented by brand building, networking firms and relationship marketing. Opportunism, 
selfishness, and deceit are not beneficial to long-term relationships, trust, generosity and 
honesty. The view that man is more long-term oriented is more in line with John Stuart Mill’s 
view of utilitarianism maximizing the happiness for the whole sentient creation. Falkenberg 
also notes “an organization depends on the trust of its stakeholders for long-term survival” 
(Freeman, 1977 in Falkenberg, 2004, p.4). Stakeholders involved are owners, customers, 
suppliers, business-partners, governments, NGO’s, local communities, the public at large, and 
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last but not least, employees. “The ethical failures that we have seen in the recent past have 
been due to excessive regards for the interests of the management at the expense of the 
interests of owners and other stakeholders. One cannot think of very many who would want to 
transact with people or organizations they could not trust” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.4). Trust is 
“the cement of society” (Elster, 1989 in Falkenberg, 2004, p.4). “Trust is the expectation that 
arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behavior, based on commonly 
shared norms on the part of other members of that community” (Fukuyama, 1995, p.26 in 
Falkenberg, 2004, p.4). Trust can be viewed as common expectations in a culture - or 
adhering to conventions. Recruiting and holding on to investors, employees, suppliers and so 
forth would be rather difficult if there was a lack of trust. “Without trust, transaction costs 
would skyrocket and our ability to transact efficiently would be seriously impaired thus result 
in a disintegration of our economy” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.4). Firms often invest heavily in 
their own reputation and brand name to make sure they live up to the promises and 
expectations related to their reputation and brand name (Falkenberg, 2004) 
If we did not trust the products we use every day, life would be intolerable – for us as 
consumers - and for the corporations. We trust our banks, the food we eat, the homes we live 
in, the cars we drive and out computers to do the jobs we expect of them. “I may not have 
high expectations of what a given fast restaurant will serve, or how a computer program will 
perform – but as long as they produce what I expect – there is trust – or at least a degree of 
predictability. This may be called an enlightened view of self-interest” (Falkenberg, 2004, 
p.4). It is “good” for a firm to have good and trusting relationships with its key stakeholders, 
and this may in the long-run also benefit the owners. Saying that the only Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) that a firm has is to maximize profit for its owners may not be at odds 
with the way the stakeholders view the firm. Setting the rules of the game is up to civil 
society, to create the institutions that govern the actions of firms – and it is up to the business 
to maximize wealth within these rules. One can say that “ethics pays” in the long term - thus 
the challenge is to provide the sticks and carrots and governance mechanisms, which promote 
the long-term welfare for all (Falkenberg, 2004). 
When entering a foreign nation with different norms, values and practices from the “home 
country”, corruption may occur. In regards to the pharmaceutical sector, one phenomenon 
which has occurred in recent years is the counterfeit drug trade. The counterfeit trade – or 
“fake drug” trade has skyrocketed over the last 10 years. The products are being marketed as 
substitutes or imitations of already known pharmaceuticals – often offering the “same” 
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product at a significantly lower price. In some cases, pharmacies/hospitals/physicians have 
ordered specific pharmaceutical products, and somewhere along the line of distribution, the 
real product has been replaced by a “bogus” product. This is a form of corruption, as the 
producer/imitator is literally offering garbage to the end customer, which may severely affect 
their health and well-being. Albaum & Duerr notes: “Owners of trademarks must be on the 
continual lookout for imitation or even outright piracy of brands that are exported to foreign 
countries. This is the growing problem of counterfeit trade, which is the practice of attaching 
brand names or trademarks to “bogus” products or services, thereby deceiving customers 
into believing that they are purchasing the legitimate brand name or product of the owner of 
the trademark” (Albaum & Duerr, International marketing and export management, 2011, 
p.635).  
“National governments are concerned with this problem, but it is difficult to resolve. To a 
large extent the exporter itself will have to “police” its foreign markets in order to detect 
counterfeiting of its products. Then government can step in. Some companies are starting to 
incorporate high-technology things in their products as a means of distinguishing the real 
from the fake” (Albaum & Duerr, International marketing and export management, 2011, 
p.636). 
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2.2 Case example: Abbot Laboratories 
 
The following case is an example of a real-life ethical issue in the marketing of 
pharmaceuticals, where the Abbott Laboratories (one of the “big” pharmaceutical companies) 
and the government of Thailand were in conflict over a patented drug being sold as a generic. 
The case is presented in “Business Ethics: Concepts and cases” by Velasquez, 2012, p. 152-
154. 
“”Many critics of free trade have argued that the international agreements and institutions 
that make free trade possible benefit global businesses, but harm the world’s poor and 
powerless. To understand these criticisms, consider, how Abbott Laboratories responded 
when Thailand’s government announced a new policy designed to provide its poorest people 
with a life-saving drug. On March 21, 2007, Abbott Laboratories, a U.S. drug manufacturer 
with annual revenues of $26 billion and profits of $4.5 billion, angrily announced it would 
now allow seven of its unique new drugs to be sold in Thailand, including the HIV/AIDS drug 
Aluviathat that, unlike similar drugs, did not have to be refrigerated in Thailand’s hot 
climate. Abbott was punishing Thailand who had decided to make a cheap version of Kaletra, 
a drug that Abbott had developed and to which it held the patent. The head of the AIDS 
Healthcare Foundation said: “I am horrified that Abbott would deprive poor people in need 
of lifesaving medications, particularly for those living with HIV/AIDS, in a country as hard-
hit by the epidemic as Thailand”” (Velasquez, 2012, p.153-153).  
“With about 600 000 of its people sick with HIV/AIDS and an average annual income of only 
$ 2190 per person, Thailand was struggling to provide its HIV/AIDS patients with 
medications called “antiretrovirals”. Although HIV/AIDS is incurable, in 1996 scientists 
discovered that if HIV patients regularly took a combination of three “antiretroviral” drugs, 
the amount of the HIV virus in their bodies declined to where they could live healthy normal 
lives. But drug companies charged so much for the combination of antiretroviral drugs - 
$10 000 to $15 000 per year in year 2000 – that AIDS victims in poor developing countries 
could not afford them. In 2001, however, Cipla, an Indian drug Company, began to make 
“generic” versions of the antiretroviral drug combinations for as little as $350 for a year’s 
supply and by 2007 its price was below $100. A “generic” drug is a chemically equivalent 
copy of a brand-name drug, but the company that makes it does not own the patent to the 
drug. Large drug companies discover, develop, and test new brand name drugs at an 
15 
 
estimated cost of about $800 million per drug. A company with a new drug can ask its 
government for a “patent” for the drug, and if granted, the patent recognizes that the drug 
formula is the property of the company and that it alone has a right to make that drug for a 
set number of years. The large U.S. and European drug companies held that without patents 
and respect for their property rights, they could not recover, and would have little incentive to 
pay, the huge costs needed to develop and test new drugs, and drug research would come to 
an end. The drug companies therefore objected to Cipla’s action, especially when Cipla 
started to sell the low-priced generic versions of their drugs to other poor countries” 
(Velasquez, 2012, p.153). 
Before 1994, patents in the U.S. gave only 17 year of protection for a new drug, - in the U.S. 
In the 90’s, the WTO was being formed, and drug companies in the U.S. started to lobby – 
targeting the government. The main purpose of the lobbying was to pressure the U.S. 
government to include patent laws in the WTO, and the drug companies made generous 
donations to politicians and government officials – who then in turn insisted that all members 
of the WTO had to adopt the strict patent and copyright laws that existed in the U.S. Poorer 
nations objected to this, but in 1995 when the WTO was “official”, the rules included TRIPS 
– Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – which was modeled on the U.S. 
patent and copyright laws, and required all member states to adopt them (Velasquez, 2012).  
A non-WTO member country would have a difficult time to sell goods to WTO nations, so 
the majority of nations joined the WTO – even though they were against TRIPS. TRIPS 
ensured that a patent given to a company by a WTO member had to be respected by all 
member states for 20 years. India and Brazil, the least developed/poorest nations, did not have 
to comply with the TRIPS laws before 2006 – later extended another 10 years. Article 31 in 
TRIPS allowed and exception to the patent rules, where poorer nations did not need the 
authorization of the drug companies to make a patented drug – but only in case of 
circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergencies (Velasquez, 2012). 
The WTO issued a ruling in 2001, stating that article 31 in TRIPS allowed a poor nation to 
give its own drug companies a “compulsory license” to make patented drugs, to protect the 
health of the people. If a poor country was not able to manufacture the drug themselves, they 
could import the patented drug from another poor country instead – given the other poor 
country also had a “compulsory license”. The WTO also stated that each nation had the right 
to determine “the grounds upon which such licenses are granted” (Velasquez, 2012, p. 154). 
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Going back to the case, Velasquez continues with: “U.S. and European pharmaceutical 
companies had lobbied hard to defeat Article 31, but in the end enough WTO countries 
supported it and it had become an official WTO rule. The U.S. and European drug 
companies, however, vowed they would continue to oppose the rule and its use, especially by 
a company like Cipla that claimed TRIPS rule allowed it to make and sell cheap copies of 
their patented drugs. On January 25, 2007, Thailand announced that it was issuing a 
“compulsory license” to one of its own government-owned drug companies so it could make a 
generic version of Abbott’s Kaletra. Kaletra was one of a new group of expensive “second-
line” antiretroviral drugs Abbott had developed and patented. When an AIDS victim began 
treatment, the antiretroviral drugs he or she received was called a “first-line” treatment and 
it was relatively cheap since companies like Cipla could provide cheap generic versions. 
Often, however, the patient’s HIV became resistant to the first-line drugs, and they stopped 
working. The patient then had to be given the newer antiretroviral drug combinations that 
were called a “second-line” of treatment that were expensive since only the large drug 
companies were making those. Thailand’s government estimated that about 80 000 of its 
AIDS victims now needed a “second-line” drug like Abbott’s Kaletra. However, it said, it 
could not afford even the “discounted” price of $2200 Abbott insisted poor countries had to 
pay for a year’s supply of Kaletra” (Velasquez, 2012, p.154). 
“Abbott Laboratories said that if Thailand started making a version of Kaletra, it would be 
taking Abbott’s property since the company held the patent and it had discovered, developed, 
and tested the drug using several hundred million dollars of its own money. Moreover, Abbott 
said, under its interpretation of TRIPS, Thailand had no right to ignore Abbott’s patent 
simply because it did not want to pay for the drug; reluctance to pay did not constitute an 
“emergency”. The head of Doctors Without Borders in Thailand said that of Abbott’s 
position: “For me, it’s just evil. It’s appalling… It reflects so badly on the multinational 
companies”” (Velasquez, 2012, p.154). 
Poorer nations often argue that the new free trade rules aids multinational companies, and are 
disadvantageous for poor countries. The poor countries say that large MNCs, like the big 
pharmaceutical companies have influenced the rules that controls international, and that they 
bend the rules into serving their own interests (Velasquez, 2012). Velasquez notes: “In the 
name of free trade, the rich nations have forced the poor nations to accept rules that benefit 
the companies of the rich nations, while ignoring the welfare of the people of poor nations. 
Moreover, critics argue, new forms of property – such as patents on drugs – have been 
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developed that seem to actually conflict with free trade, since they restrict the free flow of the 
formulas and knowledge that constitute these new forms of “intellectual property”. These 
controversies over globalizations and free trade are but the latest episodes in a great and 
centuries-ling moral debate: Should governments impose restrictions on business activities 
and economic exchanges, or should they leave business firms free to pursue their own 
interests within free markets, and allow them also to trade freely with members of other 
nations? Do governments align themselves with the interests of wealthy corporations, and if 
so, is it right for them to do so? One side argues that free markets and free trade are defective 
because they cannot deal with many of the problems business activities create, such as unfair 
competition, global pollution, unfair labor practices, sweatshops, discrimination, and 
disregard for the wellbeing of the poor. The other side argues that government restrictions on 
business are bad because they violate their property rights and right to freedom, lead to 
unfairness, and leave us all worse off” (Velasquez, 2012, p.154-155). 
One popular case when it comes to restricting government in the markets is the idea that 
humans have “natural rights” – and only a free market can protect these rights. Free markets 
are supposed to protect two natural things: the right to freedom and the right to private 
property (Velasquez, 2012). “Free markets are supposed to preserve the right to freedom 
insofar as they enable each individual to voluntarily exchange goods with other free from the 
coercive power of government. They are supposed to preserve the right to private property 
insofar as each individual is free to decide what will be done with what he or she owns 
without inference form the government” (Velasquez, 2012, p. 157).  
John Locke (1632 – 1704), is considered the father of the idea that human beings have natural 
rights to liberty and natural rights to private property. Locke argued that without governments, 
human beings would live in “a state of nature” where each individual would be equal 
(politically) and would have no constraints apart from the laws of nature – “the moral 
principles that God gave to humanity and that each individual can discover by use of God-
given reason“ (Velasquez, 2012, p.157). Locke describes a state of nature as: 
“A state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons 
as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending 
upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and 
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another… without subordination or 
subjection to another…But…the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges 
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everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that 
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or 
possessions” (Locke in Velasquez, 2012, p. 157-158). 
Locke explains that the law of nature will “teach” that everyone has a right to liberty, and “no 
one can be put out of this natural estate and subjected to the political power of another 
without his own consent” (Locke in Velasquez, 2012, p. 158). The law of nature also tells us 
that we are the sole owners of our bodies, labor, the products of labor, and that these rights to 
ownership are natural, alas: “they are not invented or created by government nor are they the 
result of a government grant” (Velasquez, 2012, p. 158). 
Velasquez analyzes the Abbott Laboratories case using Locke’s principles, and states: “Recall 
that Abbott withheld several lifesaving drugs from Thailand’s people when their government 
announced its intention to manufacture a drug that Abbott had patented. Abbott claimed that 
Thailand was “stealing” the company’s “intellectual property”. Regardless of what any 
government or other ruling body might say, Abbott insisted, it had created the formula for the 
drug and invested the money needed to develop it, and so it was Abbott’s property and no one 
else had a right to use it without Abbott’s authorization. Abbott’s position was based on the 
Lockean view that that private property is created by one’s labor and not by government. The 
right to property, like the right to liberty, are prior to, or more basic than, government’s 
authority and, as Locke insisted, government is created to protect these fundamental rights. 
The head of a pharmaceutical association that represented Abbott and other multinational 
drug companies said: “After the company does 10 years of research, and then suddenly the 
Thai government would like to impose a compulsory license, taking away the their property, 
their assets – this is not right.” Thailand’s government, on the other hand, issued a report in 
which it stated that it had “fully complied with all the national and international legal 
frameworks”, including TRIPS. It pointed out that the World Trade Organization had 
explicitly declared that to protect its citizen’s health, a country could issue a compulsory 
license and manufacture a drug without the authorization of the company that held the patent. 
Consequently, Thailand said, it was not wrong to manufacture the drug even though Abbott 
held the patent since the legal framework that created the patent and turned the drug formula 
into a form of “property”, explicitly allowed them to use the formula. Thailand’s view, then, 
was that property rights are created by government and its laws, a view that is decidedly un-
Lockean” (Velasquez, 2012, p. 159-160).  
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“Also unlike Locke, Thailand held that property rights are not absolute. Thailand said in its 
report that its decision was based on its “commitment to put the right to life above trade 
interests”. Property rights, then, are limited to “the right to life” because human life is more 
important than the international rules that protect “trade interests” by protecting property 
rights. The views of both Abbott Laboratories and Thailand, then, were shaped by their 
ideologies, i.e., by their views about which rights are most basic, about the purpose of 
government, and about the nature of private property” (Velasquez, 2012, p.160). 
This case is just one of many examples where drug companies have been in conflict with 
governments. Another example is GSK – GlaxoSmithKline, a British drug manufacturer that 
has been in several trials in the U.S. after several cases of dubious conduct, and sometimes 
outright illegal actions. The case of GlaxoSmithKline will be used later, as it is more relevant 
to unethical practices, such as marketing drugs for off-label usage. 
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3.0 Pricing, ethics and patents in the pharmaceutical industry: 
 
The following is based on the works of Schlegelmilch, in the book Marketing Ethics: An 
international Perspective (1998) 
“A perennial ethical question for the pharmaceutical industry has been the aggressive pricing 
policies pursued by most large drug companies. Criticism has intensified in recent years over 
the high cost of new conventional ethical drugs and the steep rise in prices for many drugs 
already on the market. One result of this public clamor is that the pricing structure of this 
industry has once again come under intense scrutiny by government agencies, Congress, and 
the media.” (Spinello, 1992 in Schlegelmilch, 1998, p.341) It is often claimed that the high 
prices - and the following high profits, are unethical and unreasonable, and that 
pharmaceutical companies could allegedly offer cheaper products without limiting R&D. “It 
is quite difficult to assess, however, what constitutes an unethical price or an unreasonable 
profit. Where does one draw the line in the nebulous areas?” (Spinello, 1992 in 
Schlegelmilch, 1998, p.341) 
“The major pharmaceutical companies strongly resist any form of regulation as a serious 
threat to the stability of their powerful industry. This industry has consistently put forward the 
same arguments for high prices - these focuses on the premise that premium prices are 
justified due to the excessive costs of developing new drugs” (Spinello, 1992 in Schlegelmilch, 
1998, p.343).This is based on the principle “high risk – high reward”. There are risks involved 
in the R&D when developing drugs – especially since only a few of these drugs make it 
through the expensive development process. “Moreover, even if a drug is a commercial 
success, there is always the impending threat of product liability problems that earnings 
received from breakthrough drugs such as AZT (azidothymidine – an antiretroviral drug, 
used in the treatment of HIV/AIDS) are necessary to stimulate future research and 
compensate for many commercially unsuccessful drugs”(Spinello, 1992 in Schlegelmilch, 
1998, p.343). The pharmaceutical industry’s financial performance has been superior in recent 
years, and studies which compare the performance on a number of U.S. industries has shown 
that the pharmaceutical industry consistently top the charts when it comes to return on sales, 
return on assets and return on common equity (Schlegelmilch, 1998). “For example, the drug 
industry currently boasts a return on sales of 20 per cent (1998). Also, its return on common 
equity of 31, 9 per cent compares quite favorably with the average return of 11, 7 per cent 
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and is the highest of all the industry groups tracked by Business Week (1991). These figures 
reveal that at least according to some criteria drug companies and their stockholders are 
receiving substantial returns for the risks they take” (Spinello, 1992 in Schlegelmilch, 1998). 
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3.1 Ethical questions:  
 
Spinello (1992 in Schlegelmilch, 1998) also notes that ethical or fair pricing is more 
significant when the product is such an essential and life-saving one such as pharmaceuticals, 
and not a luxury item. “Few are concerned about the ethics of pricing a BMW or a waterfront 
condo in Florida. But the matter is quite different when dealing with vital commodities like 
food, medicine, clothing, housing and education. Each of these goods has a major impact on 
our basic well-being and our ability to achieve any genuine self-fulfillment” (Spinello, 1992 
in Schlegelmilch 1998).  
Since these products are so important for the lives of human beings, the pricing – which leads 
to availability, must be considered. Several questions can be raised, such as: Should the free 
market decide the price of potentially life-saving products such as pharmaceuticals?  Given 
the importance of these products in the lives of all human beings, one must consider how 
equitably they are priced since pricing will determine their general availability. Along these 
lines several key questions must be raised. Should free market, competitive forces determine 
the price of “essential” goods such as pharmaceuticals? If the market is willing to pay, is it 
wrong to charge high prices? Is it ethical to profit at the expense of suffering? And finally, 
what is the definition of reasonable profits? The pricing issue must be considered in the 
context of the pharmaceutical industry’s guidelines on return on assets, return on common 
equity, etc. (Schlegelmilch, 1998). “On what authority are such targets chosen over other 
goals such as the widest possible distribution of some breakthrough pharmaceutical that can 
save lives or improve the quality of life? Pharmaceutical companies would undoubtedly 
content that this authority emanates from the expectations of shareholders and other key 
stakeholders such as members of the financial community. In addition, these targets are a 
result of careful strategic planning that focuses on long term goals” (Spinello, 1992 in 
Schlegelmilch, 1998, p.344).  
One important question occurs here: Should the needs of the poor and sick be taken into 
account – especially since the pharmaceutical products could mean life and death for them? 
“As with many business decisions, there appear to be stark tradeoffs between superior 
financial performance versus humane empathy and fairness” (Spinello, 1992 in 
Schlegelmilch, 1998, p.344). Should the “human cost” of the objectives of performance be 
considered? What role should justice and fairness take in pricing decisions?(Schlegelmilch, 
1998) “It is only by probing these difficult and complex questions that we can make progress 
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in establishing reasonable norms for the pricing of pharmaceuticals” (Spinello, 1992 in 
Schegelmilch, 1998, p.344).  
 
Falkenberg (2004) also offers a view on ethical maturity, using the theories of Kohlberg 
(1971). “Kohlberg (1971) suggested six possible stages of ethical maturity. The two first 
stages are the pre-conventional stages. These can be described as a rather egoistic, or a 
“sticks and carrots” view of ethics. A child will typically try to avoid pain and seek pleasure. 
One may pay taxes because one fears the consequence of not paying, or one may speed 
between the speed traps. One may pay or receive bribes if the risk of discovery is low. A 
statement like “good ethics pays” may belong in this stage. It seems that much economic 
reasoning is based on this view. The following two stages are based on adhering to the 
conventions of one’s immediate group (stage three) or of society as a whole (stage four). It is 
important to do what the others are doing, follow fashion, get approval from ones immediate 
friends, ac as the local culture expects, do what the others do because “everybody is doing 
it…”. This could be called the ethics of the old boys club or the ethics of the group to which 
one belongs. If one follows local cultural conventions, then one is doing what most people 
consider to be right. The behavior meets with approval” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.18). 
“In stages five and six, the post-conventional stages, one becomes more autonomous; 
deciding for oneself on a set of universal ethical principles to determine what is right. One 
may ignore the sticks and the carrots, and may even choose not to follow ethical principles 
because it is right to do so. Even if it is not customary to hire women into high level 
managerial jobs in Japan (by convention), and it may even be less profitable (cost/benefit) 
one may choose to do so anyway because it is wrong to keep this particular arena closed to 
women; it violates a basic ethical principle of equality. It will be argued that the pre-
conventional “sticks and carrots view” is closely linked to much of what we teach in 
economics and finance in business schools. It is also similar to much of the reasoning used by 
firms. This kind of reasoning may require an expansive set of social controls, increase 
transaction costs and not be very efficient in promoting the greatest good for the greatest 
number. It will also be argues that conventional reasoning may be useful as moral guidance 
in jurisdictions with adequate background institutions. However, when in Rome, it may not be 
right to do what the Romans do if the local institutions allow feeding Christians to the lions. It 
will further be argued that both at home and abroad, one needs to make sure that economic 
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activities are beneficial and sustainable in the long term, which would require that one looks 
to sources of post-conventional ethics in order to know what is right and wrong” (Falkenberg, 
2004, p.18). 
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3.2 Free market vs. regulation:  
“Many would question the validity of basing drug prices on anything other than pure 
economic factors. Milton Friedman and his followers have argued persuasively that the only 
social responsibility of business is to increase profits. According to this “free market” 
philosophy, the responsible course of action is to charge whatever price the market will 
accept. This if the market will support an annual price of $8000 a year for a drug such as 
AZT, that should be the end of the matter” (Spinello, 1992 in Schlegelmilch, 1998, p.344-
345). Schlegelmilch also notes that managers who do not price products to maximize profits 
are avoiding their duty to stockholders – and if the executives in the pharmaceutical industry 
were reluctant to raise prices due to a social objective, it would tax the shareholders 
(Schlegelmilch, 1998). “When managers go beyond economic and financial data in their 
decisions they become political agents with a social agenda. This is regarded by Friedman as 
a pernicious state of affairs which will undermine the very foundations of our free society, 
“since managers lack the wisdom and ability to resolve complex social problems such as the 
equitable distribution of pharmaceutical products”” (Friedman, 1979: 90) (Spinello, 1992 in 
Schlegelmilch, 1998, p.345). This narrow view of CSR fails to realize that the decisions made 
by corporations can have a powerful impact on society. The decisions of large corporations 
“inevitably involve social as well as economic consequences, inextricably intertwined” 
(Mintzberg, 1989: 173 in Schlegelmilch, 1998, p.345).  Firms become social agents whether it 
was intended or not, and it is hard to remain neutral on issues like these. It is a moral and 
social decision to determine prices – which will affect society. The corporations can choose to 
turn a blind eye or acknowledge the social consequences of their decisions – but by looking 
another way, when the damage is done, the public will protest (Schlegelmilch, 1998). 
If a company chooses to take responsibility for the social actions they can inflict, they will 
have to treat the people affected as important “stakes” in their decision. “The stakeholder 
model, which has become quite popular with many executives, allows corporations to link 
strategic decisions such as pricing with social and ethical concerns. By recognizing the 
legitimacy of its stakeholders such as consumers and employees, managers will better 
appreciate all the negative as well as positive consequences of their decisions” (Spinello, 
1992 in Schlegelmilch, 1998, p.345). “Moreover, an honest stakeholder analysis will compel 
them to explore the financial and human implications of those decisions. This will enable 
corporations to become more responsible social agent, since explicit attention will be given to 
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the social dimension of their various strategic decisions” (Spinello, 1992 in Schlegelmilch, 
1998, p.345) 
Schlegelmilch notes: “Unfortunately, as outsiders to the operations of drug companies we are 
ill prepared to judge whether development costs for certain drugs are inflated or truly 
necessary. As a result, these corporations must be trusted to arrive at their own definition of a 
reasonable profit, given the level of legitimate costs involved in researching and developing 
the drag in question. But we can look to some case histories for meaningful examples that 
would serve as a guide to a more general definition. One of the most famous controversies 
over drug prices concerned the Hoffman-LaRoche Corporation as the United Kingdom in 
which the government’s Monopoly Commission alleged that Hoffman-LaRoche was charging 
excessive prices for Valium and Librium in order to subsidize its research and preserve its 
monopoly position. In the course of the prolonged deliberations between the British 
Government and the company, reasonable profits were defined as “profits no higher than is 
necessary to obtain the “desired” performance of the industry from the point of view of the 
economy as a whole” (Matthews et al., 1985). In general, then, under normal circumstances 
reasonable profits for a particular product should be consistent with the average returns if 
the rises and costs of development are inordinately and unavoidably high” (Spinello, 1992 in 
Schlegelmilch, 1998, p.350) 
Schlegelmilch also says: “Thus, based on this Rawlsian ideal of justice, I propose the 
following thesis regarding ethical pricing for pharmaceutical companies: for those drugs 
which are truly essential the just corporation will aim to charge prices that will assure the 
widest possible distribution of these products consistent with a reasonable level of 
profitability. In other words, these companies will seek to minimize the deprivation of 
material benefits which are needed by all persons for their self-realization by imposing 
restraints on their egocentric interests in premium prices and excessive profits. Since only 
some pharmaceutical products can be considered as truly “essential”, it remains to be seen 
which of those products should be subject to the imperative of justice.” (Spinello, 1992 in 
Schlegelmilch, B., 1998, p. 350) 
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3.3 Patents: 
 
In 1984, the environment changed in the pharmaceutical sector, when the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act – also known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act” was 
passed.  
The Hatch–Waxman shortened the approval process for generic drugs. “To market a drug in 
the United States, a manufacturer must file a New Drug Application with the FDA, which 
includes data on safety and efficacy. Hatch–Waxman allows generics manufacturers to 
instead file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), which relies on the safety and 
efficacy data submitted by the brand-name manufacturer. As part of its ANDA, a generics 
manufacturer must certify that its marketing of a drug does not infringe any lawful patent; if a 
relevant patent exists, the applicant asserts either that it's invalid or that it will not be 
infringed by the generic product — and in such a case must inform all patent holders of its 
claims. Patent holders then have the opportunity to sue the generics manufacturer for 
infringement” (Hemphill, 2012, p.1682). 
Sometimes, a patent holder who does not want to risk their market position nor participate in a 
lawsuit offers to pay the competitors to delay their marketing efforts of the competing product 
– “until at least part of the patent period has elapsed” (Hemphill, 2012, p.1682). This practice 
falls under the Sherman Antitrust Act – an act which restricts inter-company agreements that 
will unfairly interfere with competition. Paying a competitor to influence them to not enter the 
market is a violation of the Sherman Act – but the patents give the owners the exclusive right 
to market the specific patented product (Hemphill, 2012) 
“The first two courts that considered pay-for-delay agreements were dubious of their legality. 
In 2001 and 2003, respectively, the D.C. and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals considered an 
agreement by pharmaceutical company Hoechst consMarion Roussel (HMR) to pay generics 
manufacturer Andrx Pharmaceuticals $40 million per year from the time Andrx's generic 
version of the calcium-channel blocker Cardizem (diltiazem) received FDA approval until 
Andrx began marketing its product or was found liable for patent infringement. Because 
another Hatch–Waxman provision gave Andrx (the first generics manufacturer to file an 
ANDA for diltiazem) a 180-day window of exclusivity from the time it received FDA approval, 
the agreement temporarily eliminated all HMR's competition. Both circuit courts viewed this 
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agreement as an illegitimate attempt to preserve monopolistic conditions” (Hemphill, 2012, 
p.1682). 
Subsequent courts had a different opinion, stating that a patent holder had the right to restrict 
competition in the market. “According to rulings that the Eleventh, Second, and Federal 
Circuit Courts issued in 2003 to 2008, patent holders could make agreements with 
prospective competitors to get them to refrain from competing, because patents confer the 
right to stop competitors from marketing the products to which the patents apply” (Hemphill, 
2012, p.1682). This meant that the Sherman Act did not apply to the practice of “pay-for-
delay” – as long as the delay paid for did not exceed the duration of the patent (Hemphill, 
2012). 
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4.0 Conflict of interest and the influence of the pharmaceutical 
industry: 
 
Kassirer (2005) notes, “”Without the willing engagement and active involvement of 
physicians”, the effects of many complicated conflicts between the medical profession and 
pharmaceutical industry would be diminished or eliminated” (Kassirer, 2005 in Green, 2008, 
p.158).) 
Thompson (1993) puts conflict of interest as “a set of conditions in which professional 
judgment concerning primary interest (such as a patent’s welfare or the validity of research) 
tends to be influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain)” (Thompson, 1993 in 
Green, 2008, p.159). “The secondary interest does not pose a choice between competing 
values that characterize ethical dilemmas in medical decisions when each competing interest 
has a presumptive claim to priority (e.g. autonomy and paternalism if a patient requests 
termination of treatment). In contrast, only one of the interests and the goal is to ensure that 
the other interest (usually financial) does not dominate” (Green, 2008, p.159). 
 A conflict usually depends on two factors: how likely it is that the secondary interest will 
affect professional judgment, and the harm this influence may cause. If a physician, intended 
or unintended, is involved in a conflict that goes against the standard of medical ethics, their 
behavior and conduct depends on: “the degree to which their behavior detracts from the 
quality of health care and its cost, the integrity of research, and the profession’s integrity” 
(Green, 2008, p.159). The pharmaceutical industry will now be assessed, by looking further 
into the relationship between the industry and physicians, medical institutions and 
governmental organizations – on a micro-level of the medical profession and a macro-level of 
society (Green, 2008)  
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4.1 The impact on the medical profession: 
 
The impact of industry contact with trainees and practitioners: Already in medical 
school, the members of the medical profession begins their relationship with the 
pharmaceutical industry, although the students often say that gifts do no influence – but 
research data does not support this view (Hodges, 1995 in Green, 2008). “Reciprocity is 
central to persuasion that characterizes the interaction between pharmaceutical 
representatives (PRs) and physicians, as gifts foster a psychological indebtedness that 
consciously or unconsciously includes a sense of obligation in the recipient. And the 
omnipresence of PRs in academic medical centers (AMCs) has been demonstrated to have 
considerable impact on attitudes, knowledge and practices of physicians (e.g. prescribing 
patterns). Moreover, the degree of interaction between PRs and trainees correlates with the 
degree of contact with future practitioners, suggesting that a pattern, in process and content, 
is established during the nascent years of training” (Green, 2008, p. 159) 
Education: A large portion of the several billion dollars spent on continuing medical 
education (C.M.E) annually in the U.S. comes from pharmaceutical companies (Green, 2008). 
In Relman’s (2001) opinion, this is not an act of generosity or charity – but rather promotion 
of products and increasing profits (Green, 2008). “An oft-quoted observation by one industry 
spokesman – “companies live through education” – supports this belief” (Vergano, 2001 in 
Green, 2008) 
“The industry directly and indirectly funds a vast network of educational activities, primarily 
through medical education and communication companies (MECCs), for-profit organizations 
that produce CME programs and presentations for hospital rounds, and didactic materials 
for private practitioners. MECCs often prepare teaching slides and curriculum materials, 
ghost-write presentations for speakers, and subsidize trainees and practitioners to attend 
meetings” (Green, 2008, p.159). Relman (2001) raises concern about the potential for bias – 
and a conflict of interest on the part of the pharmaceutical companies and the physicians hired 
by them (Green, 2008). This is supported by Kassirer (2005), who describes two situations of 
psychiatric education.” He discusses an article that compares the efficacy of Celexa and 
Lexapro (produced by the same company), endorsing the latter as a superior medication. Of 
note is that Celexa was about to go off patent (and therefore become a less profitable 
product), the article was ghost-written, and the author, paid by the manufacturer as a 
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consultant, edited the journal in which it appeared. Kassirer also reports that physicians had 
accepted US $1000 for signing their names to medical articles ghost-written by technical 
writers and submitted to neurology and psychiatry journals advocating off-label use of 
Neurontin. This particular example highlights a major reason that the industry sponsors 
educational activities” (Kassirer, 2005 in Green, 2008, p.159). In the U.S., it is illegal for 
companies to advertise medications for other uses than approved by the Federal Drug 
Administration (FDA) – now known as the Food and Drug Administration – but it is legal to 
use drugs off label (Green, 2008). “To bypass these regulations, companies recruit physicians 
to discuss off-label uses, essentially employing them for marketing purposes. The danger of 
this practice is highlighted by a situation concerning a second-generation antipsychotic 
(SGA) medication that was promoted for treating dementia in the elderly despite the fact that 
the medication carried a prominent FDA warning of increased death in the geriatric 
population” (Berenson, 2007 in Green, 2008). 
One of the fundamental responsibilities of the medical profession is to improve the skills and 
expertise of the members, and educational efforts that include scientific accuracy – or to 
promote a product, will disrupt this task (Green, 2008). Sharfstein (2006) observes that in the 
field of psychiatry, “industry-sponsored educational activities have progressively transformed 
the bio psychological model into a “bio-bio-bio” model” (Scharfstein, 2006 in Green, 2008, 
p. 159). “Focus on pharmacological treatment in lieu of psychosocial interventions can also 
result in unwarranted diagnosis and, in turn, over-prescription of medications. This situation 
was illustrated by heightened consideration afforded attention-deficit disorder in the 1990s” 
(Green, 2008, p.159). Halasz (2002) believes that the over-diagnosis of the disorder could be 
attributed to advertising efforts that: “emphasized both its prevalence and the therapeutic 
benefits of stimulants” (Halasz, 2002 in Green, 2008, p.159) 
Research: “Prior to the 1990s approximately 80% of clinical drug trials were conducted in 
AMCs under the direction of medical faculty with no potential for direct financial benefit from 
the work. Subsequently, a large amount of clinical research began shifting to non-academic 
settings, primarily practitioner’s offices, as pharmaceutical companies attempted to speed 
FDA approval by avoiding the slow-moving administrative research apparatus endemic to 
universities. Private practices enrolled patients in phase IV (so-called “post-marketing”) 
studies of existing medications, in order to investigate such issues as previously unknown side 
effects. Most phase IV testing is facilitated by contract research organizations (CROs), for-
profit research entities that organize clinical trials and employ physicians to conduct them. In 
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2001, over 100 CROs worldwide received an estimated US $7 billion from pharmaceutical 
companies” (Relman, 2002 in Green, 2008, p.160). There are several ethical issues with this 
kind of research, “beginning with consideration as to whether its primary goal is scientific 
enquiry or marketing” (Green, 2008, p.160). Contact with practitioners may affect their 
prescribing patterns – and they are likely to be influenced, often by financial incentives, such 
as recruiting patients to participate as subject in research (Green, 2008). “Second, CROs 
analyze and interpret research data with minimal oversight from the medical profession. As a 
result they may report findings based only on a portion of the data, and leave some 
investigators uninformed about other aspects of a study. For example, the high incidence of 
obesity associated olanzapine was known to its manufacturer as early as 1999, but the 
company downplayed this health risk” (Berenson, 2006 in Green, 2008, p.160). Another 
example, where a clinical trial showed that the drug Paxil did not benefit adolescents in 
treatment, and the producer held back the results “in order to minimize any potential negative 
commercial impact” (Kondro, 2005 in Green, 2008, p.160). “Third, phase IV trials may 
compromise patient’s informed consent if they are not fully aware of physician’s financial 
compensation for conducting a study or of other available treatments (e.g. less expensive 
generic medications). Fourth, physicians participation in phase IV studies may compromise 
their integrity and, in turn, that of the profession, if their primary motivation is financial 
reward. Finally, phase IV studies may expose patients to higher risk than research conducted 
in academic settings” (Lo, Wolf and Berkeley, 2000 in Green, 2008, p.160).  
CROs have also had another effect on academic-based research (Green, 2008). “Because of 
the pharmaceutical industry’s decreasing dependence on academe for professional expertise, 
the prestige of scientific publication that may contribute to market success and as a conduit 
for recruiting research subjects, its financial support of academic research has steadily 
declined. Although AMCs remain non-profit entities, they have become increasingly 
entrepreneurial in an effort to regain research dollars. For example, in 1986, 46% of private 
firms in the life sciences supported academic research; by 1996, 92% did so” (Blumenthal, 
1986, 1996 in Green, 2008, p.160).  
“By 1999, 68% of academic institutions in the US and Canada held equity in businesses that 
sponsored research performed by their faculty. During this same period, financial ties 
between individual faculty members and the pharmaceutical industry proliferated. These 
observations suggest a new revenue model of “medical entrepreneurialism” that blurs the 
line between academic and commercial values” (Blumenthal, 1986, 1996, Bekelman, 2003 in 
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Green, 2008, p.160). Relman and Angell (2002) note that since the incentives of the 
marketplace has meddled with academic medicine, “the public can no longer be confident 
that the testing of new drugs is unbiased” (Relman and Angell, 2002 in Green, 2008, p.160). 
“For example, an association exists between industry sponsorship and pro-industry research 
findings” (Bekelman, 2003 in Green, 2008, p.160). Perlis et al. (2005) studied the sources of 
funding for clinical trials that were published in 4 major psychiatric journal in 2001 – 2003, 
and found that “the prevalence of author’s conflict of interest was associated with a greater 
likelihood of reporting a drug to be superior to placebo” (Perlis et al., 2005 in Green, 2008, 
p.160). Findings like these are often attributed to the design of the study and how the data is 
reported (Green, 2008). Melander et al. (2003) studied the findings of industry-sponsored 
studies of serotonin reuptake inhibitors submitted to the drug regulatory agency in Sweden in 
order to get marketing approval for the treatment of depression (Green, 2008). They 
concluded that: “selective reporting “was the major cause for bias in overall estimates based 
on published data” and that lacking access to all studies, positive as well as negative, “any 
attempt to recommend a specific drug is likely to be based on biased evidence”” (Melander et 
al., 2003 in Green, 2008, p.160) 
The pharmaceutical manufacturer’s role in research can be summarized by Bodenheimer 
(2000). He concludes that the research done in the commercial sector is “heavily tipped 
toward industry interests, since for-profit, CROs… contracting with industry in a competitive 
market, will fail if they offend their funding sources” (Bodenheimer, 2000 in Green, 2008, 
p.160), and “academic-industry drug trials have been tainted by the profit incentive”  
(Bodenheimer, 2000 in Green, 2008, p.160), but also “contain the potential for balance 
between the commercial interests of industry and the scientific goals of investigators” 
(Bodenheimer, 2000 in Green, 2008, p.160). 
 
  
34 
 
4.2 The impact of the pharmaceutical industry on society: 
 
“Pluralist societies attempt to balance the needs and independence of individuals against a 
variety of greater goods (e.g. protecting the environment). Pluralism is characterized by the 
dynamic interaction of public and private interest groups, each of which requires financial 
support to pursue its goals” (Green, 2008, p.161). The pharmaceutical industry has vast 
resources they can use to influence politics in their favor – and by doing so, influencing 
society (Green, 2008). The pharmaceutical industry has been criticized in recent years due to 
the amount of money the industry earns, and the resources they possess. “It is sobering to 
comprehend the extent of these resources. Since the early 1980’s, it has been the most 
profitable industry in the US (falling to third place in 2003). According to Fortune magazine, 
in 2001 the 10 American drug companies in the Fortune 500 list ranked far above all other 
American industries in average net return as a percentage of sales – 18, 5% as compared to a 
median return of 3,3% for all other industries. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report 
concurs that the industry’s profits exceed the average for all US industries, but disputes the 
degree to which they do so. Nevertheless, in 2002 the combined profits for the 10 drug 
companies in the Fortune 500 (US $35, 9 billion) were more than the profits for all the other 
490 businesses combined (US $33, 7 billion) – figures that have been particular relevance to 
psychiatry. In 2003, Americans spent US $200 billion a year on prescription drugs; three of 
the 10 most popular medications in sales were the psychoactive agents Zyprexa (fifth, US $ 3, 
2 billion), Zoloft (eight, US $2, 9 billion), and Neurontin (tenth, US $2, 4 billion)” (Green, 
2008, p.161). 
The cost of medications – and in turn earnings – are justified by the pharmaceutical industry 
on the basis of the costs of R&D. Pharmaceutical companies justify the cost of medications – 
and by inference their earnings – largely on the bases of expenditures for research and 
development. “A recent, widely circulated study estimates that it takes 12 years to develop a 
new drug at and approximate cost of US $800 million” (DiMasi et. al.,2003 in Green, 2008, p. 
161). Green challenges the study with these three statements: “First, the actual expenditure is 
half the amount, as the calculation includes the “opportunity costs” of interests or earnings 
not realized from those monies invested in research and development” (Green, 2008, p.161).  
“Second, the US $800 million figure is based on development of a sample of new molecular 
entities (NMEs) by large pharmaceutical firms. However, most new non-NME drugs have 
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substantially lower research and development costs because they are incremental 
improvements of already existing products. And, as the CBO report notes, non-NMEs 
constitute about two-thirds of the drugs approved by the FDA accounting for “only about 
one-third of the industry’s R&D spending” making their average direct cost “about one-
fourth that of an NME” (Green, 2008, p. 161).  
“Third, some argue that the industry claims expenses for research that is actually performed 
by others. For example, in 1998 “15% of scientific articles cited for patent applications for 
clinical medicine came from industry research, 54% from academic centers, and 13% from 
government and the rest from various public and nonprofit institutions”. Finally, as noted by 
Public Citizen, the Washington-based consumer interest group, research and development 
costs are deductible from a company’s tax base. It therefore argues that the costs of 
development should be reduced by the amount of corporate taxes avoided, and calculates that 
the net out-of-pocket, after-tax costs for research and development would be less than US 
$100 million for each drug approved between 1994 and 2000” (Green, 2008, p.161). 
Drug pricing: Taking the previous statements into regard, one might say that the actual costs 
of research and development might be unclear in some cases. But the costs that the 
pharmaceutical industry claims will affect the price of the drugs “in a way that still raises 
ethical questions about fairness” (Green, 2008, p.161). The lion’s share of FDA approved 
drugs are non-NME, and, “as the CBO notes, the higher prices charged for those “that are 
merely extensions of current product lines may not be commensurate with the additional value 
that those drugs provide” (CBO, 2006 in Green, 2008, p.161). After the 2005 CATIE study 
(Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness), the New York Times gave a 
similar opinion, noting how the US had wasted “billions of dollars on heavily marketed drugs 
that have never proven themselves in head-to-head competition against cheaper competitors” 
(Carey, 2006 in Green, 2008, p.161). Green notes that health care resource allocation is an 
additional issue: “By expending precious funds on higher-priced medications, state programs 
(e.g. Medicaid) are forced to limit other services. In that same vein, drug pricing has a broad 
effect on society because the cost of pharmaceuticals is a rapidly growing fraction of a US 
$1.4 trillion health budget in the US, now 15-16% of gross domestic product” (Green, 2008, 
p.161). 
The pricing policies for medications will also have an effect on the individual members of 
society: “If based in a libertarian model, those with resources can purchase needed 
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medications while those lacking funds are considered victims of ill fortune but not unfairness. 
A utilitarian model for drug pricing relies on greater utilization of generic medications which 
increases the numbers of individuals who can afford medications. Many managed health care 
and pharmacy benefit plans employ this model. Finally, a fair equality of opportunity model, 
formulated by the philosopher John Rawls, relies on resource distribution that attempts to 
ensure that all citizens have an equal chance for achieving their desired goals. This can take 
the form of social policies that subsidize pharmaceutical benefits of those most in need. The 
US employs and admixture of these policies, though the predominant model is libertarian 
(paralleling the US model of health care insurance) despite skepticism about how ethical the 
distinction is between that which is “unfortunate” and “unfair”” (Green, 2008, p.161). 
Political activities: Relman and Angell (2002) propose that the pharmaceutical business is 
“critically dependent on governmental help… as its lifeblood is government-granted 
monopolies – in the form of patents and FDA-approved exclusive marketing rights” (Relman 
& Angell, 2002 in Green, 2008, p.162). The pharmaceutical industry has done extremely well 
in the US since 1980; which coincides with legislation that “has transformed the relationship 
between industry and academe, which some believe reflects the effectiveness of successful 
influence pedaling” (Green, 2008, p.162). Two U.S. Senators support this view – Bernie 
Sanders (Independent-Vermont) declared that the pharmaceutical industry “has hundreds of 
victories to its credit and zero defeats in the United States Congress”, and Richard Durbin 
(Democrat-Illinois) stated that PhRMA (The Industry’s Washington-based trade association) 
“has a death grip on Congress” (Pear, 2003 in Green, 2008, p.162). The Bayh-Dole and 
Stevenson-Wydler acts of 1980, which led to a flourishing commercial relationship between 
the academe and industry, was undoubtedly made possible via lobbying (Green, 2008). “The 
former permitted universities and small business to patent discoveries supported by tax-
sponsored research of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), grant exclusive licenses of 
those products to pharmaceutical companies, and charge royalties for their use. The 
biotechnology industry subsequently joined forces with academe and all profited from 
intramural research conducted on the campus of the NIH” (Green, 2008, p.162). In 1986, this 
was amended by the Federal Technology Transfer Act - which required “federal laboratories 
to actively seek opportunities to transfer technology to industry, universities and state and 
local governments” (Green, 2008, p.162). 
The industry’s financial success was continued by subsequent U.S. legislations, for example 
the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act which “funneled significant monies to the FDA from 
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pharmaceutical companies that paid a fee of US $310 000 in order to speed the agency’s 
review process of each new products. These user fees soon accounted for 50% of the agency’s 
budget in 2002. By 2004 they totaled US $260 million, and in 2006 represented US $400 
million of the agency’s US $1.9 billion budget” (Green, 2008, p.162). “Some view these 
developments as making the FDA financially dependent on the industry it is supposed to 
regulate, particularly since these monies were not used to monitor the safety of already 
manufactured drugs” (Green, 2008, p.162). In 2006, the Institute of Medicine blamed the 
FDA in a report for “being too interested in the rapid approval of drugs at the expense of 
ensuring their safety, and issued several recommendations about the overall review process. 
The primary goal was to bring the strengths of the pre-approval process to a post-approval 
process in order to ensure ongoing attention to a medication’s risk and benefits” (Institute of 
Medicine, 2006 in Green, 2008, p.162). 
The Medicare Bill of 2003 also acknowledged the pharmaceutical industry’s influence which, 
in terms of “dollars, the numbers of people affected, and the political stakes involved” 
(Altman, 2004 in Green, 2008, p.162), the Medicare Bill has been described as “the most 
important piece of health care legislation in the US since Medicare and Medicaid were 
originally passed in 1965” (Green, 2008, p.162). Senior citizens have two options for 
coverage; and their benefits can only come from private health plans, which raise concerns 
that one piece of legislation will not have any effect on controlling drug costs in the long run 
(Green, 2008). “Next, the federal government is prohibited from negotiation prices with 
pharmaceutical companies – in sharp contrast to the government’s ability to do so in the 
Veterans Administration system which has demonstrably lowered pharmaceutical costs” 
(Green, 2008, p.162). The legislation also contains the hotly debated “donut hole”- which 
refers to the lack of coverage between US $2251 and US $5100. “Congressional lawmakers 
may have allowed the provision in order to provide at least some aid to seniors with both low 
and high drug costs. However, it results in sicker patients with higher drug costs paying more 
for their drugs” (Green, 2008, p.162). As noted in the discussion of R&D costs, the US tax 
policies have also favored the pharmaceutical industry. “Between 1993 and 1996, drug 
companies were taxed at a rate of 16.2% compared to an average tax rate of 27.3% for all 
other major industries”. (Angell, 2004 in Green, 2008, p.162) 
Marketing: “According to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in 2001 the 
major pharmaceutical companies spent 35% of their revenues on “marketing and 
administration”, the largest single item in their budgets. That year the industry reportedly 
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spent US $19.1 billion for marketing: US $2.7 billion on direct-to-consumer (DTC) 
advertising, US $5.5 billion for detailing representatives to physicians’ offices (plus US $10.5 
billion for free samples to clinicians) and US $380 million for advertising in medical 
journals” (Angell, 2004 in Green, 2008, p.162). Green also notes that more than one-third of 
the workforce was dedicated to marketing, exceeding those in manufacturing R&D. Mintzes 
et al. (2003) argues that direct-to-consumer advertising accounts for only 15% of the money 
spent on drug promotion. “Nevertheless, it has been effective due to selective demographic 
targeting and thoughtful decisions about which products to promote (e.g. drugs are often 
advertised in response to competitors). One study concluded that if DTC “opens a 
conversation between patients and physicians that conversation is highly likely to end with a 
prescription, often despite physician ambivalence about treatment choice”” (Mintzes et al., 
2003 in Green, 2008, p.162). The money spent to finance PRs and dispense free samples 
suggests that marketing efforts are primarily focused on individual physicians (Green, 2008). 
“Approximately 88 000 sales representatives in the US visit doctors in hospitals and their 
offices, at an average cost of US $8 000-US $13 000 per physician” (Relman & Angell, 2002, 
Wazana, 2000 in Green, 2008, p.162). Many argue that the line between marketing and 
industry-sponsored education is so thin that it is nearly invisible (Green, 2008). “A General 
Accounting Office report indicates that the cost of activities such as CME meetings and travel 
subsidies to attend them, consulting fees, speakers’ fees and unrestricted educational grants 
are excluded from the industry’s US $19.1 billion marketing budget which, Angell claims, 
brings the actual figure to US $54 billion” (Angell, 2004 in Green, 2008, p.163). 
Green notes that “the effectiveness of focusing marketing on physicians is demonstrable” 
(Green, 2008, p.163). PR contact (as noted above) with trainees and physicians is likely to 
influence the thinking and behavior regarding the prescription of drugs. The results of the 
CATIE study is still being digested – and has shown that SGAs (Second-Generation 
Antipsychotics) generate US$10 billion dollars annually, and has captured 90% of the U.S. 
market (Green, 2008). Green points to the principal investigator of the CATIE study, who 
observed that “the SGA are not the great breakthrough in therapeutics they were once thought 
to be; rather, they represent an incremental advance at best” (Lieberman, 2006 in Green, 
2008, p.163). The CATIE principal investigator also attributed the preference for SGAs to “an 
overly expectant community of clinicians and patients eager to believe in the power of new 
medications” (Vedantam, 2006 in Green, 2008, p.163) as well as “enhanced perception of 
their effectiveness in the absence of empirical information” (Vedantam, 2006 in Green, 2008, 
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p.163). The CUtLASS (Cost Utility of the Latest Antipsychotic drugs in Schizophrenia Study) 
study’s principal investigator observed that ““certainly one issue” in their widespread use 
was that “pharmaceutical companies did a great job in selling their products”” (Vedantam, 
2006 in Green, 2008, p.163). Green also considers a second benefit of focusing marketing on 
physicians: facilitating off-label use of medications. “Constraint against advertising for such 
purposes can be bypassed by recruiting physicians to write and/or speak about these matters, 
then have PRs spread that information to trainees and physicians. A testimony to the 
effectiveness of this strategy was Neurontin’s earnings of US $2.4 billion in 2003” (Green, 
2008, p.163). 
Legal activities: “The pharmaceutical industry also affects society by mobilizing its vast 
financial resources in the legal arena, including reaching financial settlements with plaintiffs. 
Eli Lilly recently agreed to pay US $500 million to settle 18 000 lawsuits from people who 
claimed they developed diabetes or other diseases taking Zyprexa. In conjunction with earlier 
settlements, the company paid a total of US $ 1.2 billion to 28 500 people” (Rosack, 2007 in 
Green, 2008, p.153).  
“GlaxoSmithKline agreed to pay US $14 million to 49 states to settle allegations that it 
blocked generic versions of Paxil from being made, causing the states to pay higher prices. 
Pennsylvania had settled a previous suit primarily concerned with purchases by Medicaid. 
The company also paid US $70 million to settle a series of civil lawsuits for claims that it 
inflated wholesale prices of several of its medicines as far back as the early 1990s” 
(Washington Post, 2006, New York Times, 2006 in Green, 2008, p.163). Author notes: In 
2012, GlaxoSmithKline was subject of a settlement resulting in a US$146 million fine to New 
York State (WNYC, July 2012), and US$3 billion as a fine - the largest in the U.S. history of 
healthcare fraud settlements. The BBC report on the case: “The drug giant is to plead guilty to 
promoting two drugs for unapproved uses and failing to report safety data about a diabetes 
drug to the FDA. GSK, one of the world’s largest healthcare and pharmaceuticals companies, 
admitted to promoting antidepressants Paxil and Wellbutrin for unapproved uses, including 
treatment of children and adolescents…The illegal practice is known as off-label 
marketing…The company also conceded charges that it held back data and made 
unsupported safety claims over its diabetes drug Avandia… In addition, GSK has been found 
guilty of paying kickbacks to doctors” (BBC, July 2012).  As Green puts it: “The amount of 
money spent by the industry to pursue legal activities is extraordinary, but companies seem 
willing to accept these expenditures given the countervailing profits” (Green, 2008, p.163).  
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The Hatch-Waxman Act (Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act) of 1984 
is an example that illustrates that not all legislation favors individual companies. The Act 
“attempted to serve the dual purpose of stimulating production of generic medications while 
providing some additional protection for brand-name drugs. The intended balance of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act has to some degree been undercut by a series of legal manoeuvers 
employed by the pharmaceutical industry to exploit the second goal of the legislation. Brand 
name companies have been able to delay distribution of a generic drug for 30 months by 
suing its manufacturer on the basis of patent infringement, even though such suits were for 
uses of the drug that were different from its original patent as defined by the criteria of 
“usefulness, novelty and non-obviousness” by the US Patent and Trademark Office” (Green, 
2008, p.163). 
On the basis of the previous discussion regarding the influence of the pharmaceutical 
industry, Green offers a reflection on morality: “Morality is concerned with right ideas and 
principles of human conduct. Medical ethics examines the role of values in clinicians’ 
relationships with patients, families and colleagues – psychiatric ethics pursues the same goal 
with issues specific to mental health care – in an attempt to ensure morally correct treatment. 
Ethical deliberation and decision-making is justified by different moral theories that 
incorporate an amalgam of rights, consequences, obligations virtues and other parameters. 
For example, the decision to terminate medical treatment may be justified by the principle of 
respect for autonomy (e.g. honoring patients’ wishes) or a utilitarian calculus of whether 
continued treatment conveys more harm than benefit.  Theoretical justification in medical 
ethics can become extremely complex. For example, allocating resources on a utilitarian 
basis, characteristic of managed health care, may conflict with the Kantian belief that 
physicians have a duty to provide treatment to all. Moreover, ethical dilemmas can arise even 
when adhering to a single theory, such as trying to meet absolute, but conflicting obligations 
of Kantianism. Consequently, a methodology for ethical decision-making is required in order 
to reconcile the demands and directives of different theories, as well as any contradictions 
arising within a single theory. Hundert (1987) offers one such methodology, proposing a 
schema for balancing competing ethical values – a “reflective equilibrium” that evolves from 
clinicians’ ongoing experience. Bloch and Green (2006) suggest another framework that 
emphasizes the place of care ethics, given the importance that the approach affords the role 
of emotions in moral decision-making” (Green, 2008, p.163-164). 
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Green concludes that the medical profession should: “devote more energy informing students 
and trained physicians about the ethical pitfalls inherent in commercial collaborations, which 
already occurs in some medical schools. The profession should also reform medical and 
continuing medical education, primarily by invigorating instruction in pharmacology and the 
critical review of research design and analysis” (Green, 2008, p.164) He also notes that the 
pharmaceutical industry should not be involved in educational activities, no acts of gift-
giving, ban PRs from participating/being present in medical school training, as well as 
abolishing “drug-sponsored symposia at professional meetings; and prohibiting participation 
in speakers bureaus” (Green, 2008, p.164). He also suggests barring physicians from research 
where they (the physicians) might have financial interests, but also states that companies 
should feel free to contribute financial support to centralized institutions that are independent 
from the industry. 
On government, Green notes: “the US is the only developed nation that does not regulate 
drug pricing, which at the very least is unreasonable, and more likely unfair, given the 
millions of Americans unable to purchase needed prescription medications” (Green, 2008, 
p.164). He also mentions that the Bayh-Dole Act permit the government to take control of 
drug pricing under certain circumstances “one of which is generally interpreted to involve 
establishing reasonable costs to consumers, and those powers should be exercised when 
required” (Green, 2008, p.164). According to Green, the FDA is in need of reform, in order to 
limit the potential of conflicts of interest. 
Green ends the article saying that the public needs to be responsible to inform themselves 
about the pharmaceutical industry – for desired changes, and the influence the industry has on 
the medical profession. “This would involve the lobbying members of Congress by individuals 
and interest groups (e.g. to amend provisions of the Medicare Bill of 2003), and require 
patients to be more proactive by regularly engaging physicians in discussion about the 
rationale for specific pharmacological treatments” (Green, 2008, p.164). 
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5.0 Information asymmetry and ethical issues in cross-cultural 
marketing. 
 
5.1 Information asymmetry: 
 
“Economic theory distinguishes between three types of goods, according to the nature and 
timing of information that consumers can obtain about their quality. The quality of “search 
goals” can be ascertained before purchase, whereas for “experience goods”, quality can only 
be learned through use. The quality of the third category “credence goods” cannot be 
evaluated through normal means. Assessing credence goods’ value requires additional costly 
information. Repair of durable machines or human beings are the classic examples because 
most consumers are highly unfamiliar with their intricacies and peculiarities” (Katz, 2008, 
p.12-13). According to Katz, the line between experience goods and credence goods may not 
always be clear, especially is perceived through usage over the lapse of longer time. Most 
goods are in possession of several attributes: some of the attributes are known before the 
purchase, some after purchase, and some attributes are never discovered (Katz, 2008). “For 
example, a potential buyer of canned tuna can know before the purchase that she buys a 
canned product, and can know after purchase that the content of the can indeed looks and 
tasted like tuna. However, she may find it more costly to verify that it is indeed tuna (and not 
some imitation). She will find it prohibitively costly to verify whether eating this particular 
tuna is safe (e.g. not contaminated), or verify other attributes that some consumers may deem 
important such as whether the product contains genetically modified organisms, whether it 
was derived from organic farming, the age and working conditions of the labor force, the 
environmental impact of the production process, compliance with animal welfare standards, 
nutritional properties, or the geographical origin of the product” (Katz, 2008, p.13). 
When it comes to drugs, Katz states they can be characterized as credence good – in regard to 
the most important attributes: efficacy and safety. Customers can easily assess how effective 
drugs are for common symptoms – especially when used frequently. Looking away from 
placebos, most consumers suffering from headaches can instantly assess the efficacy of for 
example a painkiller. And similarly, most men who suffer from erectile dysfunction can easily 
assess the effectiveness of drugs like Viagra. For drug users who on the other hand, who do 
not experience the expected effects immediately, assessing a drug can be rather difficult 
(Katz, 2008). As Peter Temin (Taking your medicine: Drug regulation in the United States, 
43 
 
1980) highlights; the concept of effectiveness is a vague one, as it is not solely linked to the 
drugs ability to treat a condition – but may also be dependent on other characteristics such as: 
how the drug is administered (oral, injectable, topical), and the required dosage. It is even 
more difficult for consumers to know and evaluate the long-term effects of the drug, eventual 
complications, or how the drug may react to other substances. Even if the consumers are well-
endowed and want to combine different drugs - it may be ineffective - even lethal. The 
consumers cannot simply try every drug and cure until the “optimal” is reached. No matter 
how dramatic the effects of a drug on an individual - the effect of drugs are likely to vary 
from person to person, and meaningful information on the quality of drugs can only be 
obtained by inspecting large samples and applying statistical methods (Katz, 2008). “Not only 
is this type of epidemiological research beyond the reach of the consumers, it is also beyond 
the reach of most practicing physicians. Therefore, if sellers (drug companies) have better 
information about the efficacy and safety of their products, severe asymmetry of information 
about the quality of drugs (their efficacy and safety) may occur. And when the information 
held by sellers and buyers is asymmetric the market may fail, as George Akerlof (The market 
for “Lemons” – Quality, Uncertainty and Market Mechanism, 1970) showed in his famous 
“lemons market” paper” (Katz, 2008, p.14).  
Akerlof (1970) describes how the interaction between quality heterogeneity and asymmetrical 
information regarding the quality of products may cause markets to disappear, despite sellers 
of high-quality products willing to sell at lower prices than what the buyers to buy. Akerlofs 
model shows that the buyer’s inability to discover the quality of a product creates information 
asymmetry – which then creates the incentive for sellers of low-quality products to sell their 
goods as higher-quality (Katz, 2008). “The buyer, however, takes this incentive into 
consideration, and discounts all sellers’ quality claims, so that for any given price only the 
average utility will be considered. As a result, sellers who offer higher-than-average quality 
will be driven out of the market. Unless credible guarantees of the quality of the good exist, 
this mechanism, in which the low-quality products drive out the high-quality, repeats itself 
until a no-trade equilibrium is reached” (Katz, 2008, p.15). Akerlof presented his model 
using the used car market, and also mentioned other examples, such as the elderly having a 
reduced degree of availability of privately supplied health insurance, employers’ being 
reluctant to hire from minority groups, or undeveloped countries having a scarcity of formal 
credit markets (Katz, 2008). “Nineteenth century drug markets, and perhaps contemporary 
dietary supplement markets, could easily supplement this list” (Katz, 2008, p.15). In Akerlof’s 
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stylized model, the market disappears – but we rarely see markets disappearing together in 
real life (Katz, 2008). “They may also shrink as the frequency of transactions decrease in 
comparison to what would occur if the available information were perfect, or if “anti-lemon 
devices”, mechanisms to credibly assure the quality of products, were available” (Katz, 2008, 
p.15). Akerlof’s theory and the prediction that the market disappears is not in conflict with the 
fact that a market for quack medicines did exist in the nineteenth century. If quack medicines 
are low in costs – both in production and sale, and that it does not require any large 
investment in R&D – this seems like a viable assumption. Such a market can sustain on 
modest sales and low prices. This market can exist as long as there are enough people who are 
willing to purchase such medicines. “Therefore, it is not the market for quack medicines that 
disappears under Akerlof’s theory, but rather the market for quality medicines which 
disappears, or more precisely, fails to emerge. Therefore, while a small subset of consumers 
may deserve paternalistic regulation to protect them from their own ignorance, the more 
important effect of such regulation is actually on those consumers and sellers who would not 
otherwise be in the market” (Katz, 2008, p.16).  
Government intervention designed to increase the consumers information availability operates 
against the self-interest of the sellers. The consumers would love it, but the producers would 
hate it. In the Akerlovian case, the “honest sellers of high quality credence goods are 
interested in providing enough accurate information to consumers, yet they cannot credibly 
do so. Given consumers’ inability to distinguish between honest sellers and dishonest ones, 
sellers face the problem of persuading consumers that the information provided by them is 
indeed sufficient and accurate. Rather than causing consumers to wastefully expend money on 
ineffective drugs, this failure to signal quality results in under-expenditure on drugs, which in 
turn, may lead to under-investment. In the Akerlovian scenario, honest sellers and consumers 
alike would welcome measures that would allow them to credibly signal their quality. Such 
measures may include regulatory ones” (Katz, 2008, p.16). 
Regarding goods such as pharmaceuticals, Katz writes: “Without mechanisms capable of 
credibly assuring the quality of drugs, drug markets would perform sub-optimally. They may 
turn into lemons markets. Anti-lemon devices this enable both drug consumers and drug 
producers to increase the available gains from trade. Consumers’ trust in the safety and 
efficacy of drugs means more money for drug companies. It increases the value consumers 
ascribe to new drugs and translates into and increase in the expected returns for investment 
in new drugs. Now, if regulatory review of new drugs provides such assurances, it may 
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actually supplement patents in creating incentives to innovate, not detract from such 
incentives. The justification for patent term extension is thus turned on its head. Instead of 
decreasing the expected profits secured by drug patents, regulatory review boosts them. 
Instead of diminishing the incentives to innovate, regulatory review strengthens them. Instead 
of a burden, one can recognize regulatory review of new drugs as a valuable pro-innovation 
service the government provides. In fact, re-conceptualizing drug regulation as a service 
rendered to the drug industry may even justify shortening patent terms for new drugs. A 
potential argument could be that if the government provides this service through tax revenues, 
the public may justifiably insist on demanding earlier competitive supply of new drugs, The 
quid pro quo argument (“you penalize us by demanding prior approval of new drugs and 
therefore should compensate us”) can be used to promote just the opposite result (“we 
subsidize you by assuring the quality of your products and therefore we should get in return 
lower drug prices earlier”). Yet any such polarized views about the relationship between 
patents, drug regulation, and innovation would be misleading” (Katz, 2008, p.17).  
Katz follows up on patents by writing that even if regulatory review of drugs will generally 
benefit the industry, it can only be up to a certain limit. “If it took nineteen years for approval 
of a new drug, it is less likely that one remaining year of EPL would yield enough profit to 
make the investment worthwhile” (Katz, 2008, p.17). Regulatory review will only benefit the 
industry if a FDA approved drug sold under patent, for a short time, will generate higher 
profits than a non-approved drug that is sold under patent for the full term. Since the optimal 
patent term is unknown, it is still likely that patents should be extended - despite the positive 
effects of regulation. Even though there are benefits of regulatory approval, it does not mean 
that the regulatory framework is optimal – and cannot be improved. Improvements like 
reducing development costs may increase the incentives brought by patents and regulatory 
review, and may bring newer drugs to the market earlier. “Lastly, ultimately determining 
whether regulation is a burden or a benefit requires considering how effective alternative 
measures for quality assurance can be. In particular, it requires determining whether public 
regulation inhibits, substitutes, or complements effective market-based, anti-lemon devices” 
(Katz, 2008, p.18).  
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5.2 Ethical issues in cross-cultural marketing: 
 
The following theory is from Doole & Lowe’s book International Marketing Strategy 2008), 
pages 95-96: Cultural sensitivity is often at the heart of the ethical dilemmas that managers 
face when operating in international markets. There are few, if any, moral absolutes, and a 
few actions for which no one can provide reasonable justification. Almost every action can be 
justified on the basis that it is acceptable in one particular culture. In thinking about ethics 
managers need to be aware that simply defining what is ethical by the standards, values and 
actions from their own culture may be insufficient in satisfying all the stakeholders of a 
multinational enterprise. What is often seen as an acceptable business practice in one culture 
can be seen as ethically questionable in another (Doole & Lowe, 2008). 
The ethical challenges facing international marketing managers are many. In recent years such 
issues as environmental abuse, the use of child labor, poor working conditions and the low 
levels of pay in Third World factories have received particular attention. Western consumers 
choosing brands look for reassurance that the product has been produced in what they see as a 
socially responsible manner. Many sportswear brands such as Nike, Levi and Gap have 
suffered adverse publicity when it has been made known that child labor has been used to 
produce their products  (Doole & Lowe, 2008). 
Consumers globally are becoming better informed through better education and faster and 
more effective communications. Increasingly, therefore, they are able to question the actions 
of multinational enterprises. For their part, whilst the largest multinationals are extending 
their influence within the global markets, they are becoming more vulnerable to criticism. 
Over the past few years quality and service have improved considerably, but now firms are 
increasingly expected to ensure that their behavior is ethical and in the interests of the global 
community which makes up their market. However, international marketing executives 
operating across cultures will find themselves facing moral and ethical dilemmas on a daily 
basis on a wide range of issues. Some of those currently receiving particular attention are 
bribery and corruption, counterfeiting and piracy (Doole & Lowe, 2008). 
 
When entering a foreign nation, the cultural differences need to be addressed. In several third-
world countries, child labor is quite common, as families may not have the money for 
schooling, and thy might rely on the extra income from the children to make ends meet. The 
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international marketer must be fully aware of the culture(s) in the foreign nation, and how 
they might collide with the culture in the home-country. The differences, ranging from norms 
and values, to business procedures must be addressed, to avoid any unnecessary scandals, 
such as the Telenor in Bangladesh scenario (Falkenberg and Falkenberg, 2009). 
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6.0 Inadequate institutions: Mezzo, macro and micro levels. 
 
(Falkenberg, A. Lecture #10 in Culture & Ethics, Fall 2011) 
 
Institutions at three levels: (Falkenberg, A. 2007) 
Macro: The international level 
Mezzo: The national governance level 
Micro: The local cultural level 
When marketing internationally, the “condition” of the target markets (or even the home 
country’s) institutions are vital, in order to avoid any acts that are considered unethical. The 
focus will now shift from the practices and actions of the pharmaceutical industry to perhaps 
the most unethical act: corruption.  
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On inadequate institutions, Falkenberg and Falkenberg (2009) notes: “The exchanges or 
transactions in multinational value creation networks are governed by different sets of 
institutions, that is, (1) laws, (2) regulations, (3) norms, and (4) values that constitute 
framework behavior for a country (North, 1990). Macro institutions are those that affect 
international transactions. Mezzo institutions are jurisdiction specific at the national level for 
each country and are related to the governance of the country. Micro institutions are the 
traffic rules of behavior emanating from the culture itself. For some countries it may be 
necessary to revise North’s 1990 definition; for example, the formal institutions in a country 
are based on (1) laws and (2) regulations that may prohibit certain practices (corruption, 
child labor, and unsafe work practices). However, the more informal institutions based on 
local (3) norms and (4) values practiced at the mezzo level may tolerate and perhaps accept 
these practices. In other counties the mezzo institutions may favor the ruling elites and be 
contrary to the local cultural values. These countries are often plagued by limited economic 
freedom, monopolies, corruption, and inadequate legal systems” (Falkenberg and Falkenberg, 
2009, p.356). 
 
“If an act, that follows the traffic rules of behavior stipulated in an institution which, in turn, 
promote flourishing, then the act can be seen as ethical. Or; good consequences are a result 
of acts that follow benign institutions. Bad consequences are a result of acts that follow 
inadequate institutions, and should generally be avoided” (Falkenberg, Macromarketing 
Conference, 2007). 
As explained by Andreas Falkenberg in the Culture & Ethics and International Marketing 
lectures here at UiA, the value creation networks are governed by 4 sets of institutions: Laws, 
regulations, norms, and values. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, if there are any 
loopholes or lack of governance/monitoring in the laws and regulations, corruption may (or: is 
likely to) occur. The norms and values of course play a big part, as in certain parts of the 
world; corruption has become the rule, and not the exception. When speaking of norms and 
values, one would think that everyone knows what is right – and what is wrong, but as I 
mentioned; in certain societies, corruption had become almost a tradition – a “natural” 
element when conducting business. If the job has low pay, with little or no transparency, the 
desire for personal gain may prove too strong for “dirty” employees/officials. 
50 
 
Macro institutions are different though; as countries may be well aware of the corrupt 
practices in other nations, and will actively avoid any involvement in corruption – as 
international firms has to take care of their reputation and integrity.  
Mezzo institutions: In countries that has been synonymous with the term corruption, the 
jurisdiction may be flawed, or even in favor of corruption. A prime example: Indonesia - 
ranked as the most corrupt nation on earth, with a history where the rulers have been “Official 
Moguls” (Johnston, 2005), corruption is present in every facet of daily life and business. 
When it comes to micro institutions, a quote from one of the many conversations and lectures 
with Andreas Falkenberg:  “the traffic rules of behavior emanating from the culture itself” - 
notably poorer nations, where the incentives of participating in corrupt practices are more 
rewarding than staying “pure” – will see a larger extent of corruption. A culture where loyalty 
to your family, tribe, or clan comes before loyalty to the state – or even the general population 
- combined with inadequate institutions, leaves opportunities for unethical practices and 
corruption. 
“Corruption is a big problem in many countries with inadequate institutions. Organizations 
that trade with corrupt governments must sometimes “help” cleptocrats steal from the 
treasury” (Falkenberg, 2012). 
In a country, where corruption is present in any of the institutions, in the author’s opinion – 
the institutions can be classified as inadequate.  
The article “When in Rome… Moral Maturity and Ethics for International Economic 
Organizations” by Falkenberg (2004) address inadequate institutions, and Falkenberg states:  
“Modern and well developed markets do not operate according to the “law of the jungle” 
with guile opportunism and deceit. They function within a set of “traffic rules” or institutions, 
which have evolved over time. Institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction (North, 1990). Institutions include the legal and regulatory framework in a 
jurisdiction as well as the norms, values, customs and patterns of behavior present in a 
particular place at a given time” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.20). In a democratic country, the 
country’s cultural values are reflected in the institutions – and one might say that Kohlberg’s 
conventions (presented earlier) are represented by the institutions (Falkenberg, 2004). “The 
will of the people is reflected in the institutions through a democratic process” (Falkenberg, 
2004, p.20) - meaning different cultures will have different institutions, for example 
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institutions in Norway, Mexico and Thailand. International companies will therefore meet 
differences in foreign markets. In the West, institutions are generally in place to make sure 
that companies/organizations will not act in a harmful way, violate rights, the environment, or 
being unjust. The firms are expected to promote the interests of society, in addition to their 
own (Falkenberg, 2004). “The institutions are like traffic rules that are internalized in the 
members of a culture in a common set of do’s and don’ts (Hofstede, 1984)” (Falkenberg, 
2004, p.21). In the past, firms and individuals sometimes focused entirely on their own 
economic gain, with great consequences for the parties involved. Adam Smith was in his time 
a great critic of the “dealers”. Resulting from the conduct and decisions of economic 
organizations, “movements” were formed – for example the labor movement, the 
environmental protection movement, the female rights movement, the abolitionist movement, 
the civil rights movement and so on (Falkenberg, 2004). As Falkenberg puts it: “Each of these 
movements has had some success in changing the way we think about our right and wrong. 
They have influenced our cultural values; our conventional thinking and the institutions that 
govern what economic organizations can and cannot do. Often, these “movements” have 
been voluntary non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), inclusive groups (Olsen, 1965), 
deriving their influence from their large following. Over time, the advocacy of these groups 
has resulted new norms and values within a culture and eventually in new laws and 
regulations governing our conduct. We have seen developments in civil rights for different 
groups, safer products, better pollution standards etc. The NGO’s have also helped shape our 
sense of fairness and what constitutes good business practice. Our feelings of rights and 
wrong have changed and we have a different built-in moral compass today that our 
forefathers had a hundred years ago. Conventions have changed” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.21) 
Cultures in the West have developed quite similar institutions that regulate economic 
activities. If you want to compete in European Union or the United States, you will have to 
follow resembling rules and regulations concerning the firms’ relationship to: the workforce, 
customers, competition, the environment, gender equality, minorities, the environment, the 
society etc. (Falkenberg, 2004). “As long as a firm competes within the limits set by these 
institutions, it may by and large, look out for its own interests; its own costs and benefits in a 
utilitarian manner. This is not to say that all the institutions are just, or that following them 
constitutes ethical acts (Falkenberg, 1996). It used to be considered appropriate not to grant 
women access to certain arenas, notably in education and certain kinds of employment. 
Institutions are slowly evolving – and it is hoped that is it in a direction which will produce a 
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better world for the whole “sentient creation” as John Stuart Mill expressed it. In other 
words, following current institutions/conventions does not ensure ethical behavior. Firms that 
adhere to the minimum of the legal requirement only, may be considered marginally ethical at 
best. It may be legal to sell pornography, gambling services, alcohol, and tobacco or to 
stimulate their demand, but it may not be the hallmark of the ethical firm” (Falkenberg, 2004, 
p.21). 
Compared to the home country, the institutions in emerging and developing countries are 
often quite different. One might say that the institutions in the developed world are a little 
“tighter” – alas a little better to protect the people and the environment from abuse. 
Falkenberg explains the institutions in emerging and developing countries may be influenced 
by: 
- “The legal and regulatory framework may be incomplete and fail to adequately 
protect people and the environment from harmful practices”. 
- “There could be cultural differences which may permit practices which are in clear 
violation of basic human rights, such as differential treatment based on political 
beliefs, religion, nationality, race, ethnicity or gender. This of course is still a problem 
in developed countries”. 
- “One cannot always assume that there is a democratic government in place – thus the 
institutions may not be grounded in the local culture, but designed to serve those with 
political and economic power”. 
- “The social conditions may be such that one can ill afford to cover basic needs in the 
areas of education, health care and nutrition for the children”.  
- “Concern for basic survival may override concerns for the environment, safe products 
and the like”. 
- “Corrupt officials and judges may disrupt the proper functioning of markets, 
competition, property rights and due process of law”. 
- “Poor countries may have to agree to unreasonable terms when seeking to attract 
much needed foreign skills, technology and investment. Many countries are much 
smaller in economic terms than the major multinationals and must often negotiate 
with other locations for MNC investments” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.21). 
Based on the statements above, one might say that when it comes to a framework for 
economic organizations, developing economies may lack “adequate background institutions” 
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(DeGeorge, 1993 in Falkenberg, 2004, p.22). This might lead to some ethical dilemmas for 
multination companies, as it may be possible to act unethically since there might be no laws 
or regulations against it. The local cultural values/conventions may also not be in conflict with 
what we regard as unethical acts. Violating laws or regulations may not lead to any 
consequences for the company, due to failure/lack of enforcement of the authorities 
(Falkenberg, 2004). 
Falkenberg describes the scenario where a company enters a foreign market with inadequate 
institutions as follows: “If a firm were to take full advantage of the local conditions in an 
opportunistic, selfish and egoistical manner, costs could be reduced substantially; revenues 
could be increased, this positively affecting the bottom line. It may be possible to hire 
employees at or below subsistence wages. It may be possible to hire and exploit young 
children or expose employees to hazardous working conditions. It may be possible to deplete 
natural resources, extinguish species, release toxic wastes to the water or to the air, ignore 
unions, bribe public officials, pay no taxes, produce and sell dangerous products, or engage 
in illegitimate discrimination. And it may be possible to work with government officials and 
obtain rights to natural resources, which would normally belong to the people of the country. 
An opportunistic ethical egoist may engage in these kinds of activities if the chances of getting 
caught are next to nil. However, it is not a comforting thought that some our material welfare 
may be resting on exploitive practices in LCD’s” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.22). 
Both utilitarianism and ethical egoism are in favor of employing cost benefit analyses and to 
use an expected value calculation as a tool when making decisions. Does crime pay – and 
what are the benefits? What are the odds of getting caught – and what will it cost to be 
exposed? Calculations like these are sometimes used for the interests of the firms – not for 
society. Cost benefit analysis and value calculation may serve a great purpose when searching 
for efficiency – but not a good idea when it comes to ethics (Falkenberg, 2004). Falkenberg 
presents the reasoning of an opportunist as follows:  “I will do something bad if the 
probability by with a wrongful act, times the benefits of the act, is greater than the probability 
being caught, times the cost of punishment” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.22). The Ford Pinto prone to 
bursting into flames in left turn rear end collisions, and when deciding not to install a 
protective device, Ford uses a calculation similar to Falkenberg’s opportunist: (# of 
accidents)(cost per accident) < (cost of a part)(# of vehicles sold) (Shaw and Barry, 1992 in 
Falkenberg, 2004, p.22). “The application of this kind of calculus met with public outrage and 
it was clear that it was unacceptable by convention in the American culture. Hopefully, 
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managers have learned from cases like this one – but we still see a lot of “business decision” 
made with insufficient regard to affected parties. Ethical egoists may apply the cost/benefit 
analysis on a national or international level (greatest good for the greatest number); the 
ethical egoists usually focus on what is good for the individual or the organization without 
much regard for others” (Falkenberg, 2004, p.22). 
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7.0 Government, political and legal forces: 
 
In the book International marketing and export management by Doole & Lowe (2011, p. 218 
– 222), the role of government is defined as: As an environmental force affecting 
international/export marketing, government intervenes in a single country’s (and the world) 
economy by being a participator, planner, controller, or stimulator. Such intervention 
activities can be categorized into the following three groups: 
- Those that promote (i.e. encourage or facilitate) international/export marketing 
transactions. 
- Those that impede such transactions. 
- Those that compete with or replace international/export marketing transactions by 
private business firms. 
These basic types of intervention exist to some extent at all levels of government, but with 
varying emphases. At the supranational level, the actions taken are primarily those whose 
effect is to encourage and facilitate international marketing relationships, especially exports. 
Illustrations include the many agreements and conventions that are made between countries, 
such as international commodity agreements, and bilateral agreements. (Albaum & Duerr, 
2011)  
Protection of intellectual property is of concern to most governments, and there are patent and 
copyright laws “on the books”. Looking at the process of obtaining a patent, standards for 
what is new, or even how to describe something new, vary widely, and the process involves a 
mass of paperwork. What is really lacking is a single global standard, something that will be 
necessary if globalization is really to take hold. Progress was made for such a standard in June 
2000 when 43 countries signed – and 64 others were expected to sign – a new world patent-
law treaty under the auspices of the United Nations’ World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO). The treaty, known as the Madrid Protocol, became effective in late 2003. Members 
of the Protocol include Australia, Japan, Korea, Singapore, the United States and most 
European countries. A trademark owner files a simple application with the home country, a 
“basic” registration, and can designate extension of the registration to other member 
countries. The most significant impact – in addition to standardizing forms, etc. – is the 
requirement that authorities of member states accept nationally any patent filed according to 
an international standard known as PCT, or Patent Co-operation Treaty. This is a step towards 
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filing a single patent according to a global standard. The United States and the European 
Union have developed innovative trade initiatives to enhance the protection of international 
property rights and allow managers to better deal with anti-counterfeiting tactics. These 
initiatives, which target both organized pirates and consumers, are discussed by Chaudhry 
(2006). Individual companies also have a responsibility to protect their intellectual property 
by following sound practices regarding registration. For example, in some countries, 
intellectual property rights are granted to the first registration of a trademark; China is one 
such a country. In other countries, such as the United States, protection is given to the first 
use. One industry in which counterfeiting occurs regularly is the pharmaceutical industry. In 
addition to pursuing legal redress from counterfeiters by courts Pfizer has used another 
approach – civil suits to recoup money lost to counterfeiters and more (Bennett, 2010 in 
Albaum & Duerr, 2011). 
In addition to regulating trade, government also regulates other business activities, although 
not to the extent some would like. Major concerns include the environment, labor rights, 
human rights, intellectual property, tax policy, antitrust, and corruption. Corruption of 
officials is of concern to many throughout the world. Corruption can affect the international 
marketer in many ways, both positive and negative. Countries are using many measures to 
fight corruption with the intent of control, reduction, and ultimately elimination. A role model 
of how to handle the problem is Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC), which has been very effective in Hong Kong. A region where corruption has a long 
history is Southeast Asia, except Hong Kong. While there have been encouraging signs of 
effective counter-corruption measures, there is still much to be done. This situation stems in 
part from a lack of laws, personnel, and money to fight corruption. But the resource in 
shortest supply is political will to tackle the problem (The Economist, 2004b in Albaum & 
Duerr, 2011).  
Katz (2008) notes: “If the assumption that without regulation or other forms of quality 
assurance the market will become a market for lemons is true, then rather than a burden, 
regulatory review of new drugs may actually be an effective mechanism for assuring the 
quality of drugs, on that drug companies would have had to establish themselves in order to 
avoid the “lemons” problem (e.g. by establishing their own certifying body)” (Katz, 2008, 
p.11-12).  
57 
 
It is possible that the governments are most suited to undertake this role, as they act as a 
disinterested third party. Governments can impose sanctions for attempts of cheating, and 
enforce compliance with the approval process. Rather than hindering innovation, regulating 
the approval of new drugs may actually act as a service that increases the expected returns 
from innovation (Katz, 2008). “Drug regulation provides the quality assurance necessary to 
persuade consumers to purchase drugs, and patents provide the mechanism for recouping the 
investment necessary for developing both the drug and information regarding their quality. 
Moreover, even if drug regulation increases the cost of innovation, it increases the cost of all 
new drugs so it “simultaneously discourages creative destruction through between-patent 
competition… [thus providing] an improved patent by keeping out low-quality innovators that 
could have competed with high-quality innovators” (Lichtenberg & Philipson, 2002). 
However, the cost of regulation is not equal for all drugs. Testing and approving the new 
drug whose safety and efficacy are apparent will be less costly than testing and approving a 
new drug that is less effective and causes more side effects and complications, Therefore, 
drug regulation’s discouraging effect affects low quality drugs more than it affects high 
quality drugs, which then face less intense competition in the market place”. (Katz, 2008, 
p.12) 
The following is translated from Andreas Falkenbergs’ Kulturverdier, etikk og økonomi 
(2012), pages 244-249: 
Corruption is often related to politicians and the public sector, which have the power to decide 
how the resources in a society should be used. In everyday life, the politicians are busy with 
elections and re-elections. To achieve this, you have to gather as many voters as possible, 
often through expensive campaigns. Money and support can be achieved by prioritizing 
certain interest-groups both politically and economically: energy-companies, the health sector, 
the education sector, the transport sector, farmers, unions, lawyers, the elderly, the media, 
political youth-organizations, the cultural sector, publishers, newspapers, religions and 
spirituality, cooperation’s, the tourist industry, sports or artists. 
These priorities can come in different forms. They could be nice tax-laws for different groups, 
customs and surcharges to protect industries from international competition, bidding 
preferences, allocation of resources directly to specific groups, legislation that prioritize 
specific groups etc. If democratically elected politicians promise to allocate more resources to 
their voters than they are willing to demand in taxes, the democracy will gradually decline. 
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Rogue politicians in certain countries have discovered that they can bribe their voters with the 
voters own money. This is the case in Greece, where the present (and future) citizens have 
exacerbated their lives through political opportunism, with the help of international banks. 
The crisis hit Greece, but should also equally hit the banks that have lent money to the Greek 
politicians. (Falkenberg, 2012, p.244-249). 
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8.0 Corruption: 
 
(The 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), by Transparency International. 
http://en.rian.ru/infographics/20111202/169219288.html) 
 
According to Michael Johnston, corruption can be described as: 
“Corruption involves the abuse of a trust, generally one involving public power, for private 
benefit which often, but by no means always, comes in the form of money. Implicit in that 
notion is the ideas that while wealth and power have accepted sources and uses, limits also 
apply. But in rapidly changing societies it is not always clear what those limits are, and the 
term “corruption” may be applied broadly (Hao and Johnston, 2002). Even in more settled 
societies its meaning is open to dispute, manipulation, and change” (Johnston, 2005, p.11) 
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“I define corruption as the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit, but 
emphasize that “abuse”, “public”, “private”, and even “benefit” are matters of contention in 
many societies and of varying degrees of ambiguity in most. If our goal were to categorize 
specific actions as corrupt those complications would be a serious difficulty; indeed they are 
reasons for the inconclusive nature of the definitions debate. But at a systematic level, 
particularly where the problem is severe, such contention or ambiguity can be useful 
indicators of difficulties or change at the level of participation and institutions” (Johnston, 
2005, p.12) 
Another definition from Mühlbacher, Leis and Dahringer (2006) is: 
“The word corruption comes from the Latin verb “rumpere”, meaning “to break”. What is 
broken in the case of corruption is a moral or social norm of behavior, or, more often, 
administrative rules. To be broken, administrative rules must be precisely formulated and 
transparent. A second element of the term corruption is that the administrator breaking the 
rules receives a favor in return for him/herself, the family, friends, his/her clan or party, or 
another social group. In addition, this favor in return must be seen as a direct “quid pro quo” 
(this for that) for a special act of breaking a rule. This simple description of corruption shows 
that there are many sources of problems with “corrupt practice” in different cultural 
environments” (Tanzi, 1995 in Mühlbacher,Leis and Dahringer, 2006, p.197). 
Doole & Lowe (2008) covers bribery and corruption briefly on page 96-98 in International 
Marketing Strategy. An integral part of conducting business internationally is the practice of 
gift-giving. However, in many Western countries such practice is seen as bribery/corruption 
and is tightly regulated and controlled. Business gift-giving – or bribery, depending on your 
point of view – if improperly executed, could stop sensitive negotiations and ruin new and 
potential business relationships. German and Swiss executives tend to feel uncomfortable 
accepting gifts, which they view as bribes, as they will not want to be seen as being under 
obligation to the other party. However, business gift-giving in many cultures is an important 
part of persuasion. In cultures where a business gift is expected but not given, it is an insult to 
the host. In China it would be virtually impossible to gain any local government approval 
without offering financial inducements. (Doole & Lowe, 2008, p.96) 
Cultures that view bribery as an unacceptable business practice tend to fall into the high 
context category. In such a culture the communication style is more implicit, non-verbal and 
more reliant on hidden cues in the context of personal relationships. In Japan, for example, a 
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highly developed and affluent society, gift-giving practices are widespread in the business 
culture. Refusing to participate in gift-giving in such cultures can cause bad feeling and 
misunderstandings between business clients. In high context cultures, financial inducements 
are often seen as important steps in bringing a person into the inner circle of a business 
relationship or to strengthen the relationship between a buyer and seller. By contrast, people 
in low context cultures rely on explicit contracts, communication is more formal and explicit 
and negotiations based on a more legalistic orientation. Laws applying to bribery tend to be 
very well laid out. In some cultures, all business gifts will be viewed as illegal bribes; on the 
other hand, other cultures view gifts, pay-offs, and even bribes merely as a cost of business. 
Bribery and corruption are part of the commercial traditions of many parts of Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East. Transparency International, a global counter-corruption watchdog, ranks 
Indonesia as the most corrupt country, followed closely by Vietnam. They estimate in 
Vietnam that 20% of infrastructure spending finds its way into the pockets of corrupt officials. 
(Doole & Lowe, 2008, p.96-98) 
In the book The many faces of corruption, Campos & Pradhan (2007), offer some perspectives 
on corruption in the pharmaceutical industry, and the following is from pages 31 - 32. 
The pharmaceutical system is susceptible to fraud and corruption for a variety of reasons. 
First, the sale of pharmaceutical products is lucrative, the more so because the final customers 
(patients and their families) are more vulnerable to opportunism than they are in many other 
product markets, mainly because of asymmetric information. Pharmaceutical suppliers (drug 
manufacturers, importers, wholesalers, prescribers, and pharmacists) are profit maximizers 
and will choose to behave in ways that maximize their interests. There is nothing wrong with 
profit maximization so long as behavior does not go beyond legal norms and, in the health 
sector, professional ethical norms. The illegal sale of counterfeit, substandard, unregistered, 
and stolen drugs is particularly attractive where the opportunity for arbitrage exists.  In 2002, 
for example, preferentially priced HIV drugs produced by GlaxoSmithKline that were 
destined for poor patients in Africa were intercepted and illegally resold in Europe at a 
substantial markup by a Dutch wholesaler. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & 
Pradhan, 2007, p.32) 
In the transitional economies of Eastern Europe, to give one regional example, the rapid 
deregulation and privatization of the pharmaceutical sector, combined with an often unstable 
economic and political environment, not only created opportunities to engage in corruption 
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but also became a survival strategy for many when salaries of government and health sector 
workers declined sharply in real terms in the early transition years. In Albania, corrupt actions 
included private financial interests determining the drugs to be procured for the public health 
system, bidders giving kickbacks or bribes to gain access to confidential information, and use 
of direct procurement instead of competitive bidding without sound justification (Vian, 2003). 
In recent years, Albania has made significant strides in eliminating corruption from public 
procurement of hospital drugs by introducing a transparent, international tendering system 
that has significantly lowered the price of the average purchase contract for a given drug 
(World Bank, 2006). However, a history of weak drug quality controls has caused consumers 
to equate cheap prices with bad quality, and so the low-cost generic drugs often go unused. 
(Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, 2007, p.32) 
The pharmaceutical sector is also susceptible to fraud and corruption because it is subject to a 
significant degree of government regulation. If appropriate checks are not in place, individual 
government officials might control several core decision points in the pharmaceutical supply 
chain and may have discretion in making regulatory decisions. Government intervention is 
justified in the pharmaceutical sector given the imperfect nature of the market and the need to 
improve the efficiency of resource allocation. Also, regulation is rationalized on the grounds 
of protecting human life and public health by ensuring that only safe and efficacious 
medicines are made available in the market. However, the trade-off is that the incidence of 
corruption may be higher because the state retains a major role in the sector and its 
bureaucracy is pervasive (Marshall, 2011). Without transparency and an accountability 
framework, state regulation in the pharmaceutical sector can be subject to regulatory capture, 
permit individual deviance from norms, and be open to corruption in general.  (Cohen, 
Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, 2007, p.32) 
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8.1 Framework for identifying corruption: 
 
The framework for identifying corruption is presented in The many faces of corruption by 
Campos & Pradhan (2007) on pages 33 – 34. 
The pharmaceutical system is technically complex. It is made up of several core decision 
points, ranging from manufacture to service delivery, each of which must be recognized and 
understood so that corruption cannot thrive out of ignorance. (Cohen, Cercone & Macaya, 
2002). By understanding the multiple decision points along the pharmaceutical value chain, 
decision makers can determine where and how corruption can occur and implement effective 
anticorruption strategies to improve transparency and accountability. If best practices are 
known, inefficiencies and incompetence are easier to identify and address. This in turn creates 
a pharmaceutical sector that is less vulnerable to the risks of corruption. (Cohen, Mrazek & 
Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, 2007, p.33) 
The framework is built on the rationale put forward by Klitgaard: M (monopoly) + D 
(discretion) – A (accountability) – T (transparency) = C (corruption). This corruption 
framework can assist decision makers in identifying circumstances that allow monopoly and 
discretion and situations where limited accountability and transparency could contribute to the 
risk of corruption. Policy makers can use the framework to diagnose potential risk points for 
corruption and to develop anticorruption strategies that address specific, identified risks. 
While the nuts and bolts of a pharmaceutical system are similar from country to country, the 
vulnerable decision points may differ and may even vary within different levels within the 
same country. Each core decision point needs to function well so that the system as a whole 
offers safe, efficacious, and cost-effective medicines. If only one decision point is vulnerable 
to corruption, the integrity of the entire supply chain is at risk, which means that the 
population’s access to essential medicines could be compromised. If a particular decision 
point is corrupted, the impact on health outcomes may also vary, depending on the 
institutional organization of the system and the depth of the corruption. (Cohen, Mrazek & 
Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, 2007, p.33 - 34) 
Klitgaard (2000) identifies three main phases in combating corruption. The first phase 
involves consciousness-raising and includes educating decision makers and the public about 
corruption and its deleterious effects. The second phase involves adding system analysis to 
consciousness-raising to determine where pharmaceutical systems are vulnerable to 
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corruption. The third phase involves determining what strategies are necessary to prevent 
corruption from happening in the first place. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & 
Pradhan, 2007, p.34) 
Using the Klitgaard equation M (monopoly) + D (discretion) – A (accountability) – T 
(transparency) = C (corruption), (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, The 
many faces of corruption, 2007) can be a helpful tool to assess a foreign market for the 
possibility of corruption, and if corruption is detected, use the three phases mentioned above. 
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9.0 Anatomy of corruption: Five (Six) core decision points: 
 
 
The model above is from Campos & Pradhan (2007) The many faces of corruption, p.35. 
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The following theories and discussion are presented by Campos & Pradhan in The many faces 
of corruption (2007) from pages 33 – 53. In the following theory and analysis, there an 
additional sixth point not shown in the model: Distribution - and it is presented before 
Prescribing and Dispending. 
Manufacturing: Manufacturing of pharmaceutical products requires adherence to standards of 
good manufacturing practice (GMP) to ensure “that products are consistently produced and 
controlled to the quality standards appropriate to their intended use and as required by the 
marketing authorization” (WHO, 2003). GMP is a term defined in the quality assurance to be 
followed by drug manufacturers to help ensure that the products meet the required quality. 
Unless these established standards are followed throughout the manufacturing process – 
including handling of raw materials, storage, and packaging and labeling – there are risks to 
quality of drugs produced. Where such standards are not clearly defined or are weak or poorly 
enforced, there is a higher risk that counterfeit or substandard drugs may be in circulation. 
Counterfeit or fake drugs are defined as drugs that are deliberately made to look like the 
original product, and they thus violate trademark or patents. Drug counterfeiting is a growing 
market globally. The Center for Medicine in the Public Interest forecast that the global market 
for counterfeit medicines will grow more than 90 % by 2010 to reach annual sales of $75 
billion (Pitts, 2005). Substandard or counterfeit medicines can result in poor health outcomes, 
and in the worst case scenario, death. One of the most tragic examples occurred in Haiti in 
1995, where 89 people died when they consumed paracetamol cough syrup prepared with 
diethylene glycol, a toxic chemical used in antifreeze. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos 
& Pradhan, The many faces of corruption, 2007) 
Registration (and market authorization): Drug registration and market authorization were 
originally introduced to protect patients from drug catastrophes like the thalidomide tragedy 
of the 1950’s, when inadequate safety testing of the drug resulted in severe malformities in 
children born to women who had taken this drug during their pregnancies.  The process of 
market authorization is generally undertaken by a national drug agency, responsible for the 
evaluation of a drug’s safety, its efficacy against a specific disease, its possible side effects, 
and, in the case of a generic, its bioequivalence or bioavailability.  
Drug regulatory agencies are also often responsible for setting and enforcing standards 
relating to the manufacture, storage, and distribution of pharmaceutical products; licensing of 
pharmacists, pharmacies, and wholesalers; defining labeling, marketing, usage, warning, and 
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prescription requirements: and providing post-market surveillance. Examples of potential 
vulnerabilities at the registration decision point include the following: the law defining drug 
registration may be weak, vulnerable, or flawed; suppliers may pay government officials to 
register their drugs without the requisite information; government officials may deliberately 
delay the registration of a pharmaceutical product to favor market conditions for another 
supplier; or officials may deliberately slow down registration procedures to solicit payment 
from a supplier. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, The many faces of 
corruption, 2007) 
Selection: For publicly funded drugs, the primary government task in drug selection is to 
ensure that the most cost-effective and appropriate drugs for a population’s health needs are 
chosen with a fair and transparent manner through the use of impartial expert committees. 
WHO’s essential drug list (EDL) is a helpful framework for most developing countries 
because it establishes priority medicines and lists the most common diseases together with 
effective and affordable drugs. However, if the selection process is not institutionally sound, 
even if the EDL is followed, corruption can still occur because manufacturers have a strong 
interest in getting their products listed. If institutions are weak and individuals have incentives 
to engage in corrupt activities, the selection process can be replete with kickbacks and payoffs 
so that drugs on a national drug list are not necessarily those that are appropriate and cost 
effective. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, The many faces of corruption, 
2007)  
Procurement: The goal of procurement is to acquire the right quantity of quality drugs at the 
most cost-effective price. Government functions in this decision point include inventory 
management, aggregate purchasing, public bidding contests, technical analysis of offers, the 
proper allocation of resources, payments, receipt of drugs purchased, and quality control 
checks. Procurement is often poorly documented and processed, which makes it an easy target 
for corruption.  (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, The many faces of 
corruption, 2007) 
Distribution: Whether it is done by a government agency or by a private company that has 
been contracted by the government, the public distribution system needs to ensure the timely 
and safe delivery of appropriate quantities of drugs to health facilities and pharmacies where 
supplies are needed. Distribution and storage costs and make up a significant amount of the 
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retail price of a drug, especially when drugs are distributed to remote locations or where a 
lack of competition leads to inappropriate markups by wholesalers and retailers.  
Poor storage conditions can lead to losses through both the diversion (corruption) and the 
expiration of drugs (inefficiency). A well-designed and well-managed distribution and storage 
system aims to maintain a constant supply of drugs, keep them in good condition throughout 
the distribution process, minimalize drug losses due to spoilage and expiry, rationalize drug 
storage points, and use available transportation resources as efficiently as possible. (Cohen, 
Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, The many faces of corruption, 2007) 
 
 
Drug prescribing and dispending: The main concern with drugs prescribing and dispending is 
that the patient may not always receive the most appropriate drug for a given condition 
because the prescription decision can be driven by other factors, in particular, a self-interested 
profit motivation. In any developing countries, it is common for a pharmacist or an 
unqualified drug seller to dispense drugs without a prescription. In such situations, the 
pharmacist takes on a critical role in drug choice and can be directly motivated to dispense the 
most expensive drug to earn a higher margin rather than select the most appropriate product 
for a patient. This inherent conflict of interest is one reason for separating the prescribing and 
dispensing functions. The task for a government if the prescription system is weak is to 
establish a regulatory environment that promotes appropriate drug choice and dispensing 
practices and cost-effective care. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, The 
many faces of corruption, 2007) 
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The following analysis/discussion is developed using the theories from Campos & Pradhan in 
The many faces of corruption (2007) from pages 33 – 53. 
Manufacturing: The multinational pharmaceutical industry is particularly concerned about 
ensuring the integrity of its supply chain and mitigating reputation risks by preventing 
infiltration of counterfeit drugs. While bar coding and scanning have been popular methods 
for the past 20 years, leading drug makers are rapidly embracing more sophisticated 
technologies such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and electronic product codes 
(EPCs). The advantage of these newer technologies over bar code systems is that the older 
system requires personnel to “read” the codes, while the newer systems are automated to read 
and store the information in ways that can easily be retrieved. In the case of RFID, this 
information can be easily read and retrieved from anywhere throughout a network that can 
extend across countries, enabling manufacturers to track and monitor their products (including 
storage conditions) more easily. Further, with this system a wholesaler, retailer, or even 
customs official, for example, could potentially read the RFID tag to check the electronic 
pedigree of a product and hence verify its legitimacy and integrity. To further discourage 
counterfeiting and the production of substandard drugs, those manufacturers found to be 
noncompliant with standards should be named, penalized, and shamed, with their violations 
publicly announced. Compliant manufacturers should also be recognized and have their 
names posted on the drug agency Web sites, for example, to help health professionals and 
patients more easily recognize the manufacturers that are achieving quality. (Cohen, Mrazek 
& Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, The many faces of corruption, 2007) 
Registration (and market authorization): Various strategies can be used to lower the risk of 
corruption in the drug registration process. For example, to minimize the risk of individual 
discretion, procedures should be applied uniformly and all criteria made available to the 
public. The regulatory authority must operate impartially and justify its decisions clearly and 
openly. To facilitate this, all regulatory employees should be screened for any potential 
conflict of interest that could bias any decision making. Information on the drug registration 
process, its criteria, and results should be published regularly and disseminated in local 
newspapers and on the Internet. Disclosing the Web site lists of all applications for 
registration and of all registered drugs (with dates) increases transparency. Overhauling the 
drug quality control requires a multipronged approach pushed forward by strong political 
leadership. Drug quality control requires not only a transparent drug agency but also ongoing 
market surveillance. To ensure the integrity of the drug supply, a market surveillance strategy 
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should include mechanisms for monitoring the drug supply, such as random batch testing and 
reporting streams to ensure feedback from health professionals and users to responsible 
authorities when problems are identified. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, 
The many faces of corruption, 2007) 
Selection: There are several strategies for curbing the risk of corruption in the selection 
process. Explicit criteria must be defined ahead of time by and expert committee and 
publicized so that stakeholders have clear knowledge about what criteria are being applied in 
the drug selection process. Members of the expert committees should be publicly identified, 
and their credentials and the terms of reference for membership on the committee posted 
publicly. As long as the methods used are uniform, publicly available, and based on objective 
criteria, and the process is as transparent and objective as possible, corruption can be curbed. 
Suggested strategies include public dissemination of written procedures for pricing; 
establishment of specific criteria and terms of reference committees, which should include 
disclosure of any potential conflict of interest; the monitoring and dissemination of prices; and 
creation of a formal appeals committee to hear pricing disputes. Making pricing decisions 
publicly available over the Internet has also helped to add transparency. Assessing the 
vulnerability of this process is vital to identifying a strategy to strengthen the process. Best 
practices in transparency and mitigating corruption in pharmaceutical pricing can be taken 
from a number of industrial countries that have learned from their own incidences of 
corruption to identify less vulnerable processes. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & 
Pradhan, The many faces of corruption, 2007) 
Procurement: The best protection against corruption is generally international competitive 
procurement because it maximizes competition and minimizes opportunities for personal 
discretion in the selection of suppliers. Competitive procurement requires an open bidding 
process and clear criteria for the selection and processing of winning bids. The procurement 
process must include continuous monitoring, including reviews from the inspector general’s 
office or similar internal and external audit institutions for the public sector (USAID, 1999). 
Reports must also be easily available for public scrutiny. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in 
Campos & Pradhan, The many faces of corruption, 2007) 
Distribution: Some countries have introduced codes of Good Distribution Practice that 
standardize requirements for distribution personnel, documentation, premises, and equipment.  
If good practices are not in place for this decision point, direct losses can be caused by 
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breaches in the process, including incorrect transport and storage conditions, unnecessary 
stocks, expired stocks, and theft of drug suppliers. Opportunities for the diversion and theft of 
goods are present in all stages of the storage and distribution system. Shipments can be 
plundered by sea – or airport workers or systematic crime syndicates may steal large 
quantities from customs warehouses, airport fields, and elsewhere. During transportation, 
drugs may be sold by drivers at markets along the way, or large quantities may be diverted to 
the black market. Politicians and local leaders may divert supplies to their supporters or 
patronage networks, and health facility staff may resell subsidized drugs or steal drugs for use 
in their own private practices or private use. (Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & 
Pradhan, The many faces of corruption, 2007) 
Drug prescribing and dispending:  
A problem area in many countries is the potential for corruption when drug companies seek to 
influence physicians’ drug prescription practices. The influence of the industry on physician 
prescribing behavior is a concern globally, but it can be particularly influential in developing 
countries, where physicians are typically not well paid well and standards of legal or 
professional ethical behavior are less well established or enforced. A recent WHO report on 
drug promotion noted that in the United States, almost $21 billion was spent on drugs 
promotion in 2002. The same report emphasizes that the pharmaceutical industry is often the 
only source of drug information for health care providers in developing countries (Norris and 
others 2005).  
Prescription fraud is a common form of medical claims fraud in public and private health 
insurance systems and can involve doctors, pharmacists, and patients. Prescription forms need 
to be treated with the same type of security features as blank checks, and systems put in place 
to detect, investigate, and prosecute fraud to countervail this problem. Some countries have 
introduced electronic systems for tracking prescriptions and dispensed drugs by patient, 
doctor and pharmacist and use data analysis to identify risks of claims of fraud. 
Strategies to reduce corruption in this decision point could include ensuring that patients 
receive drugs only with the appropriate prescription. That will be challenging, however, so 
long as patients face a financial disincentive of having to pay for both the cost of the 
physician visit to receive the prescription and then the cost of the drug. Even where insurance 
systems are meant to cover both physician visits and drug costs, in areas where pharmacy 
salaries are low, additional informal payments are often charged on “free” drugs to 
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supplement the pharmacist’s income. Pharmacies and pharmacists should be subject to 
appropriate licensing and inspections and breaches should be sanctioned. Typically, these 
aspects of pharmacies are self-enforced through associations of pharmacists. Corruption can 
occur in this decision point if codes of conduct either do not exist or are ineffectively 
enforced. However, ensuring their enforcement is challenging, particularly for the private 
retail drug market in developing countries. (Enemark, Alban, and Velasquez, 2004).  
(Cohen, Mrazek & Hawkins in Campos & Pradhan, The many faces of corruption, 2007) 
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10.0 Conclusions 
 
When marketing to foreign markets, the differences between the “home” country and the 
foreign countries may lead to challenges for the international marketer. The pharmaceutical 
sector suffers from a bad reputation, even though the intentions of the services and products 
offered are good - and can potentially mean the difference between life and death. The fact 
that the industry is extremely profitable fuels the accusations of “excess, or “unreasonable” 
profits – which the industry defends by stating the fact that the research and development 
costs of a single drug – which might never even make it to the market – is in the range of 800 
million dollars. Although criticized, patent protection gives a pharmaceutical company only 
17 years of exclusive rights to sell the drug, and when a drug goes generic, the profitability 
decreases. That leaves the pharmaceutical companies with reasonably short time to earn back 
the enormous costs of R&D, which in turn requires them to set high prices. On the other hand, 
the cases of unethical conduct, like promoting drugs for off-label usage, or the practice of 
doing something unethical (and more profitable than doing it the “right” way) and paying the 
fine/penalties (which will still leave them with more profits than doing it “right”) is harder to 
defend. 
The information asymmetry that exists between the industry and the end-consumers is 
decreasing, most notably in the more developed parts of the world where information 
technology is getting more and more available to all members of society, and the end-
consumers can evaluate their options before consulting a doctor/physician. The public and the 
government have a responsibility to educate themselves, as transparency is a widespread norm 
these days. The author notes that both the public and governments should restrict the 
involvement of influence groups, as well as reducing the influence the pharmaceutical 
industry has on the medical profession, as Green (2008) noted with centralizing all monetary 
funds and let institutions separated from the industry be in charge of distributing monetary 
support for research and development. 
It would be rather bold to state that a country where corruption is present has a “corrupt 
culture”. The pharmaceutical sector is vulnerable to corruption, and being an international 
marketer in this sector may be a challenging task. In certain areas of the world, corruption has 
become a “natural” part when doing business, but may still be in conflict with the norms, 
values and traditions. Even here in Norway, we have experienced a series of corruption 
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scandals being uncovered. Corruption in the pharmaceutical sector is very complex, and may 
occur on nearly all stages, from manufacturing to distribution and dispensing. There are 
pitfalls everywhere, and the author feels that the vulnerabilities discussed are just a part of the 
pharmaceutical sector’s problems. It seems that flawed jurisdiction and laws, loop holes and a 
lack of government initiative (and/or will); along with inadequate institutions and incomplete 
procedures/standards when dealing with pharmaceuticals are the drivers behind corrupt 
practices in the pharmaceutical sector. 
In the authors’ opinion, one solution might be through technology and the cooperation with 
governments (as long as they are not corrupt!), along with raising awareness and being pro-
active. International marketing is a wide term, and corruption is sadly a part of it.  When 
working in different cultures, with “different ways of doing things”, problems may occur – 
which is normal when cultures “clash”. Countries with large gaps between the rich and poor 
may have a high degree of opportunism, which may lead to underpaid pharmacists, 
physicians, doctors, government officials – and marketers seeing a potential for exploiting 
their position for their own private gain – on the expense of the lives and health of the end 
consumers/customers. 
When writing this paper, the subject felt enormous – but this paper has hopefully covered at 
least the basics of the issues concerning ethics in the pharmaceutical industry, and ultimately, 
corruption. The subject is a very important one – which encourages to further studies, in the 
authors’ case: looking further into patent laws and patents in other industries. 
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